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The Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
and Foreign Public Law
FELIX D. STREBEL*
I. INTRODUCTION
Where conflict of law rules designate foreign law as applica-
ble, the foreign law is generally recognized and applied in order to
determine the rights and obligations of the parties. This hospital-
ity encounters a certain reserve, however if the foreign law has a
"public law" character. In the absence of an international treaty
or convention, the courts of Canada,' Switzerland and other coun-
tries will not enforce foreign tax, penal and other laws that may be
characterized as "public" or "political" in nature. 2 This general re-
fusal to recognize foreign public law in enforcement proceedings
has been described as the "public law taboo."3
Two developments have taken place over the last few decades
that demand clarification and reevaluation of non-enforcement of
certain foreign public laws. First, assuming that a clear distinction
* Dr. Felix D. Strebel, LL.M., is a Partner with Stern Fromm & Partner, Zurich,
Switzerland, a law firm specializing in commercial and corporate law, as well as interna-
tional litigation and international legal assistance. This article is based on the LL.M.-thesis
submitted to the University of British Columbia, Vancouver, and the author thanks Pro-
fessor Joost Blom for his most valuable advice and his expert supervision.
1. The terms "Canadian courts" or "Canadian law" refer to the Canadian common
law provinces or territories. This article does not address the laws of the province of Que-
bec.
2. See J.G. CASTEL, CANADIAN CONFLICT OF LAWS 161-63 (3rd ed. 1994); see also
DICEY AND MORRIS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 108 (Lawrence Collins, ed., 11th ed.
1987) (stating that "[tihe issue thus still remains open for decision in England whether the
doctrine that penal and revenue laws will not be enforced extends to laws of a 'political' or
'public' character") [hereinafter DICEY AND MORRIS]; see generally IPRG KOMMENTAR
107-11,256 (Anton Heini et al., eds. 1993).
3. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Public Law in the International Arena: Conflict of Laws,
International Law, and Some Suggestions for their Interaction, in RECUEIL DES COURS 322
(1979).
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between private and public law once existed, modern legislation
and court awards of "punitive civil sanctions" have obscured that
distinction. 4 Second, the ongoing trend toward internationaliza-
tion and globalization has forced courts to deal with international
matters more frequently.
The state's concern for public welfare and economic order ex-
tends to relations between private parties. This concern has led to
state interference through the use of public law. 5 Even western
"capitalist" countries regulate, license, tax, and punish more types
of activities. 6 After determining that complex issues require posi-
tive state intervention, legislatures enact statutory and regulatory
regimes to provide for civil and administrative remedies in areas
such as environmental, securities, and competition law.7 In addi-
tion, some states, most notably the United States, have innova-
tively created new enforcement mechanisms whereby a private
litigant, induced by an award of multiple damages, acts as a "pri-
vate attorney-general who protects the public interests." 8 In the
United States, civil courts increasingly tend to grant "punitive civil
sanctions." 9 This makes civil law more punitive, thus departing
from the traditionally compensatory alignment.10
Due to ongoing developments in private international law, it
is uncertain whether any one state will enforce the penal laws of
another. Furthermore, by their increased participation in com-
mercial activities, many states have become players in the global
market-place, where they compete with private entrepreneurs and
corporations. As a result, public and private law have become in-
creasingly interwoven, and the traditional distinctions no longer
apply.11 These developments require the prohibition on the en-
4. The term "punitive civil sanctions" was introduced by Kenneth Mann. See Ken-
neth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal and Civil Law,
101 YALE LJ. 1795 (1992).
5. See Frank Vischer, General Course on Private International Law, in RECUEIL DES
COURS 150 (1992) (referring to the developments in labor law, the law of tenants, and the
field of economic law).
6. See Lowenfeld, supra note 3, at 325.
7. See United States of America v. Ivey [19951 O.R.3d 533, 534.
8. Mitsubishi Motors Corporation v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
630 (1985).
9. See K. Mann, supra note 4, at 1795.
10. See id. at 1798.
11. This is so even for Continental European systems, where the dichotomy between
public and private law is-or rather used to be-much more pronounced than in the com-
mon law.
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forcement of foreign penal and public law to be reevaluated. De-
veloping a modern system is necessary to deal with these changes.
Parallel to these "internal" developments, which blur the dis-
tinction between public and private law, lies a strong trend toward
globalization. Activities such as trade, investment, communica-
tions, transportation, financial transactions, and others increasingly
cross national boundaries. 12 Internationalization leads to an in-
creased quantity of cases where courts are asked to apply foreign
law or to give effect to foreign judgments. This may compel courts
to discuss issues relating to the enforcement of foreign public law.
Switzerland is highly vulnerable to this trend for two reasons.
First, as one of the leading countries in asset management, 13 Swit-
zerland contains many seizable assets. Second, Swiss law estab-
lishes jurisdiction were the attachment of assets occurs.14 The
Swiss court system (i.e., courts in the district where a judgment
debtor's assets are located) is thus an inviting "forum" for judg-
ment creditors.
Canada takes a different approach to enforcing foreign judg-
ments. With the exception of Quebec, Canada is a common law
jurisdiction like the United States. Due to its geographical loca-
tion, Canadian courts frequently deal with U.S. law and judgments.
One can systematically evade enforcement of tax laws simply
by transferring funds subject to a judgment out of the court's juris-
diction to another state or country. 15 Thus, collection on such a
judgment might be impossible, even though the foreign tax law is
perfectly reasonable or even less rigid than the laws of the state's
courts asked to enforce it. In fact, the judgment debtor will not
have to pay any taxes at all and can essentially shirk its responsi-
bility under the judgment completely. Thus, the non-enforcement
rule facilitates "fraudulent practices which damage all states and
12. See Lowenfeld, supra note 3, at 325.
13. A recent study estimated that Swiss banks manage assets on behalf of national
and international clients that total over 2.300 billion Swiss francs (approximately 2.530 bil-
lion Canadian dollars).
14. See SR 291.435.1 (Switz.). For English translation, see Appendix 1 citing to the
Federal Statute on Private International Law, Dec. 18, 1987 (Switz.) translated in PIERRE
A. KARRER & KARL W. ARNOLD, SWITZERLAND'S PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
STATUTE OF DECEMBER 18, 1987 127 (1989).
15. See Government of India v. Taylor [1955] E.R. 292 (stating that when India at-
tempted to collect a tax from the liquidator of a firm that had long operated in India, the
House of Lords denied the claim for the sole reason that it was a foreign tax claim).
1999]
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benefit no state."'
16
The customary explanation for non-enforcement of foreign
public rights (including tax collection) is that the ability to claim
public rights is an exercise of sovereign power, which is, per defini-
tionem, limited to laws within a state's territory. Traditionally, no
state would tolerate intrusion by a foreign state on its exercise of
sovereignty. 17 Many unscrupulous individuals and corporations
take advantage of this sovereignty principle to avoid paying debts.
Although Canada and Switzerland are reluctant to enforce
foreign public and domestic laws, they assist the enforcement of
foreign criminal laws by routinely granting extradition. Therefore,
it can hardly be said that the enforcement of foreign public law is
contrary to all Canadian and Swiss principles of territorial sover-
eignty. This raises various questions. To what extent should for-
eign public law be enforced in the absence of an international
treaty? What is the significance of sovereignty in today's world?
When is a state's sovereignty endangered? Finally, how far should
states go in order to help each other enforce their respective laws
and judgments? Only by developing a policy for enforcement of
foreign public law that uses a system to weigh the interests in-
volved will these questions be answered.
Thus, an absolute exclusion of enforcement of foreign public
law is inappropriate and should be abolished. To reach this con-
clusion, an examination of how the "penal rule" affects the puni-
tive civil sanctions and a reassessment of the "tax rule" are neces-
sary.
A. Scope of Analysis
Discourses on the enforcement of foreign judgments usually
focus on issues of international jurisdiction. A common issue to
resolve is whether the court that rendered the judgment had prop-
erly assumed its jurisdiction. 18 This Article, however, will examine
the rationale that excludes certain categories of judgments from
international enforcement solely because of their subject matter.
16. Williams & Humbert Ltd. v. W. & H. Trade Marks (Jersey) Ltd. [1986] A.C. 368,
428.
17. See FREDERICK A. MANN, FURTHER STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 358-61
(1990).
18. See discussion infra Part I.E.2.
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After defining relevant terminology and presenting the meth-
odological framework, this Article will provide an overview of the
different requirements that Canadian and Swiss law rely upon for
recognizing and enforcing foreign judgments.
Parts II and III provide a comparative analysis of Canadian
and Swiss enforcement of foreign judgments based on foreign
revenue, penal and other public laws. These parts will provide an
objective investigation and realistic overview of the underlying
theme of enforcement of foreign judgments.
Part IV examines the rationale behind the refusal to enforce
certain judgments due to their subject matter. It also includes a
critique of the various court rationales for excluding foreign public
law as well as a redefinition of the exclusionary rule.
Part V concludes by proposing a new rationale for state en-
forcement of foreign public law.
B. Methodological Basis
This Article uses two methodological approaches in examin-
ing existing foreign policy: first, a comparative law approach; and
second, an approach which examines the contributions of public
international law achievements in analyzing the modern regime of
law enforcement.
1. Comparative Law
Judging from its literal meaning, comparative law can be de-
scribed as the juxtaposition of different legal orders. This juxtapo-
sition extends both to the spirit and style of the entire legal system
("macro-comparison") and to the solutions of specific problems
("micro-comparison"). 19 Following a description of the basic
structure and general requirements of Canadian and Swiss en-
forcement of foreign judgments, there will be a comparative analy-
sis of the doctrine and cases which examine how Canadian and
Swiss law treat foreign judgments based on foreign penal, tax and
other public law. Where appropriate, the policy for enforcement
of foreign judgments from other jurisdictions will be considered.
Ultimately, comparative law is a method of gaining knowl-
edge. 20 It enlarges the number of possible solutions to a specific
19. KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTz, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARITIVE LAW 4-5
(Tony Weir trans., 2d ed. 1987).
20. See itt at 15.
1999]
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problem, thereby increasing the chances of finding a "better solu-
tion." In the arena of private international law, comparative law is
"indeed so indispensable for its development that the methods of
private international law today are essentially those of compara-
tive law."21 The preparation of a transnational unification of the
law is probably the most important function of comparative law.
22
Unification is most desirable in private international law, because
it applies the same national law regardless of the court that as-
sumes jurisdiction. Furthermore, uniformity in enforcement is
crucial so long as courts require reciprocity when asked to enforce
a foreign judgment.23 It is thus the interaction of the methodology
of comparative law and private international law that plays a key
role in the examination of enforcement of foreign judgments.
2. Public International Law
This Article focuses on the enforcement of international laws
that lie on the border between "private" and "public." Enforcing
foreign judgments focuses on the effects of a foreign act; jure im-
perii (the foreign judgment), and thus, generally deals with the re-
lations between the states (public international law). Therefore, it
is necessary to explore the principles of public-international law.
Discourse in the field of enforcement of foreign judgments
and foreign public law deals with the concept of state sovereignty
and the principle of territoriality of laws. It is also worth exploring
whether the principles of international cooperation, solidarity and
comity require a more generous attitude towards enforcement of
foreign judgments. Recent developments in Canada tend towards
this conclusion. In Morguard Investments Ltd. v. De Savoye, the
Supreme Court explicitly referred to the comity principle in order
to grant the enforcement of an extraprovincial judgment.
24
21. See id. at 6.
22. See id. at 23.
23. A comprehensive comparative law discourse about the requirement of reciprocity
in international enforcement of judgments can be found in Kurt H. Nadelmann, Non-
Recognition of American Money Judgments, 42 IOWA L. REV. 236, 249 (1957). Yet, the
requirement of reciprocity, although still in existence in several national laws, continues to
disappear. For a more recent study, see Friederich K. Juenger, The Recognition of Money
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 36 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 (1988).
24. See Morguard Investments Ltd. v. De Savoye [1990] S.C.R. 1077. The issue was
whether the original court properly assumed jurisdiction. The Supreme Court's reasoning,
however, regarding comity was not limited to jurisdictional issues, but in favor of en-
forcement of foreign judgments.
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C. Terminology
1. Enforcement
The term "enforcement" or "to enforce" will be used to mean
a writ or other judicial directive issued upon application of a plain-
tiff that empowers and directs a state official to seize a debtor's as-
sets.25 In this sense, enforcement is part of the execution process.
It consists of the actual seizure, the sale, and the distribution of the




In this Article, the term "money judgment" refers to every
kind of order, decree, or judgment of a judicial or administrative
authority where a defendant must pay a sum of money, rather than
other types of relief (e.g., injunction or specific performance).
3. Civil Matter, Private Law and Public Law
27
Under common law, the term "civil matter" usually describes
anything that is not a "criminal matter."28 In civil law jurisdic-
tions, however, the term "civil matter" 29 is synonymous with a
"matter governed by private law" as opposed to administrative
and criminal law. The term "public law" is used in the same way in
both legal systems. It refers to laws dealing with relations between
an individual and the state or between states and the organization
of government.30 "Public law" includes international, constitu-
tional, criminal, and administrative law.31 Tax law is generally ac-
25. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 528 (6th ed. 1990).
26. See id.
27. For a detailed discussion of the historical evolution of public law as a distinct
subject of jurisprudence, see Hans W. Baade, Operation of Foreign Public Law, in
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 3-7 (Tubingen: J.C.B. Mohr,
1991).
28. THE DICTIONARY OF CANADIAN LAW 188 (2nd ed. 1995). For U.S. law, see L.
Frei, Discovery, Secrecy and International Mutual Assistance in Civil Matters, in
LITIGATION OF BUSINESS MATTERS IN THE UNITED STATES AND INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL ASSISTANCE 196 (R. Zch ed., 1984).
29. German: "Zivilsache"; French: "Matiere civile".
30. THE DICTIONARY OF CANADIAN LAW, supra note 28. From a civil law perspec-
tive, the category administrative law includes bankruptcy law, procedural law (both civil
and criminal), social security law, parts of security, competition and environmental law.
31. See id.
1999]
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cepted into the category of "public law."
D. Manifestation of Foreign Public Law in Conflict of Laws
A court may be asked to apply foreign public law to a pre-
liminary or incidental question.32 This occurs, for example, when a
conflict of law is over a person's nationality. Article 22 of the PIL
Statute states a rule of universal applicability. It provides that the
law of the state that is at issue determines a person's nationality.
The consequence is that a Swiss court would apply foreign public
law when determining a person's nationality. Tort claims are an-
other example where the applicable conflicts rule points to the lex
loci delicti. Thus, to determine whether there was negligent con-
duct in a car accident, the court must consider foreign road rules.
It seems unlikely that any court would see a problem in applying
these types of foreign administrative rules. Likewise, where a con-
tract is written solely to evade foreign taxes, courts are more likely
to enforce foreign tax laws.33 In these types of cases the courts are
free to argue that domestic rules of public morality render such a
contract void.
The real problem with enforcing foreign public law arises
where the lex causae, the law on which a claim is founded, is of a
public nature. Two types of cases can be distinguished when oper-
ating under foreign public law: (1) those cases where an action
commences before a domestic court and one party asks for a direct
application of foreign law; and (2) those cases where the enforce-
ment of a judgment is at issue. In both cases, the court is required
to give effect to the foreign law.
In an enforcement action, plaintiffs ask the court to extend
the effect of res judicata to its jurisdiction, impliedly enforcing for-
eign law. Swiss law applies a flexible standard where a foreign
court has already determined rights and duties. In a Swiss en-
forcement procedure, as opposed to a direct application of foreign
law, a less strict attitude governs.34 Conversely, Canadian law ap-
32. See generally CASTEL, supra note 2, at 157-60; IPRG KOMMENTAR, supra note 2,
at 108. There is no problem with applying foreign public law to a preliminary question in
connection with a private law issue.
33. See J.G. Castel, Foreign Tax Claims and Judgments in Canadian Courts, 42 CAN.
B. REV. 277, 300-01 (1964) [hereinafter Castel, Tax Claims].
34. Adopting the French doctrine of "ordre public att6nu6 de la reconnaissance." See
infra Part I.E.3; BGE 103 Ia 531; BGE 103 Ia 204; see also Vischer, supra note 5, at 198
(regarding jurisdiction (indirect competence) of the original court).
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plies the same standard in both situations. 35 Nevertheless, it seems
safe to conclude that in cases where the direct application of a for-
eign law would be granted, the enforcement of a judgment based
on such a law will not be measured on higher standards concerning
its compatibility with public policy or with the exclusion of foreign
public law. This Article will focus primarily on the enforcement of
judgments.
E. Common Requirements of Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
36
1. General Remarks
There are three basic approaches to determine whether
judgments rendered abroad should be given the effect of res judi-
cata locally: (1) the forum may simply disregard foreign judg-
ments; (2) it may recognize only those judgments rendered in ju-
risdictions that grant reciprocity; or (3) it may recognize any
foreign judgment that meets certain procedural and substantive
standards.37 Switzerland and Canada chose the third approach.
Neither country allows parties to re-litigate the merits of the dis-
pute,38 and they both waive the reciprocity requirement.
39
Generally, both Switzerland and Canada will enforce a for-
eign judgment where it was rendered by a competent court (juris-
diction in the international sense), after due notice to the defen-
dant,40 in accordance with natural justice, and so long as the
foreign judgment does not violate public policy.
41
35. See CASTEL, supra note 2, at 275; but see id. at 164.
36. Despite its practical relevance no effort will be made to distinguish between pre-
requisites and defenses, but each requirement will be discussed on its merits.
37. See Juenger, supra note 23, at 5.
3& Compare CASTEL, supra note 2, at 268-69 with SR 291 art. 27(3); see IPRG
KOMMENTAR, supra note 2, at 293-94.
39. Until 1989, when the PIL Statute came into force, cantonal law governed the en-
forcement of foreign judgments, and most cantons required reciprocity. Under the PIL
Statute the reciprocity requirement still exists in the recognition of foreign bankruptcy de-
crees. See infra Part III.D.4.
40. For obvious reasons, the due notice-requirement is only relevant for default
judgments. See SR 291 art. 27(2)(a).
41. In addition, the adjudication must be final and conclusive and the judgment must
not have been procured by a fraud on the court. With regard to the former requirement,
for Canadian law, see Nouvion v. Freeman, 15 App. Cas. 1 (1889). See Robert J. Sharpe,
The Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, in DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW: PRACTICE AND
DOCTRINE 668 (M.A. Springman & E. Gertner eds. 1985); see also P. J.M. Lown, Conflict
of Laws, in CREDITOR-DEBTOR LAW IN CANADA 686 (1995). For Swiss law, see SR 291
1999]
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2. Jurisdiction in the International Sense
There are pronounced differences in jurisdictional regulation
in the Continental European tradition and the Anglo-American
system.42 While the latter is mainly concerned with providing an
adequate solution in each case, the concern with certainty of the
law in continental Europe has led to the creation of pre-fixed rules
stating the conditions under which courts may, or must, assume ju-
risdiction.4
3
The most important requirement for the enforcement of for-
eign judgments is whether, in the eyes of the enforcing court, the
original court properly assumed jurisdiction. Both legal systems
recognize that the defendant's presence44 within the jurisdiction,
or his or her submission 45 to the court's jurisdiction, is a natural
basis for the appropriate assumption of jurisdiction.
46
More complex jurisdictional issues arise in default judgments,
where the defendant resides outside of, and has not submitted to,
the jurisdiction of the original court. In Morguard Investments
Ltd. v. De Savoye, the Supreme Court of Canada expanded the
obligation to recognize extra-provincial judgments within Canada.
Referring to comity as "the informing principle of private interna-
tional law," 47 and the constitutional framework, the Court held
that the original court's jurisdiction over a non-resident, non-
submitting defendant was justified by the real and substantial con-
nection between the case and the forum.
48
art. 25(b). See IPRG KOMMENTAR, supra note 2, at 260.
42. See Vischer, supra note 5, at 204.
43. See id. at 205. The doctrine of forum non conveniens is unknown in Continental
Europe.
44. Swiss law requires "domicile" of a person in the rendition state. But the Swiss
concept of domicile is distinct from the Canadian one. In the terminology of the PIL Stat-
ute an individual has his or her domicile in the country in which he or she is living with the
intention of staying permanently. See SR 291 art. 20(1)(a). In this sense, if a person has
no domicile, SR 291 article'20(2) provides that his or her habitual residence serves to re-
place domicile (and not the domicile of origin that is of no significance in Swiss law). A
person's habitual residence is the place where a person is living for a certain time, even if
this time is limited from the outset. See SR 291 art. 20(1)(b). Therefore, under Swiss law,
a temporary presence that does not amount to a habitual residence, would not be regarded
as a basis for a proper assumption of jurisdiction.
45. By consent (before or after the dispute arose: forum prorogatum); by uncondi-
tional appearance (e.g., by arguing the merits of the case). See CASTEL, supra note 2, at
260ff.
46. See Juenger, supra note 23, at 13-20.
47. Morguard Investments Ltd. v. De Savoye [1990] S.C.R. 1077,1095.
48. See Joost Blom, Conflict of Laws - Enforcement of Extraprovincial Default Judg-
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
In Moses v. Shore Boat Builders Ltd., the British Columbia
Court of Appeal applied the "real and substantial connection test"
to a non-Canadian judgment. The court enforced an Alaskan
judgment because the original court had sufficient connections
with the litigation and, therefore, had properly ascertained juris-
diction in the matter.
49
In Hunt v. T & N plc. the Supreme Court of Canada con-
firmed the constitutional dimension of the rules set forth in Mor-
guard.50 Morguard and Hunt, however, leave open many ques-
tions, especially in the context of international enforcement.
Nevertheless, there is a distinct trend towards accepting a foreign
court's jurisdiction on the basis of comity, so long as the assump-
tion of jurisdiction is reasonable in the eyes of the enforcing court.
In Switzerland, the PIL Statute contains an inclusive set of ju-
risdictional provisions for the recognition and enforcement of for-
eign judgments in each regulated field of law.51 Additionally,
Swiss general rules provide that a foreign court's jurisdiction may
be based on the defendant's domicile52, his or her submission 53, or,
in the case of a counterclaim, on the basis that the foreign court
had jurisdiction over the principal claim, and the two claims are
materially connected. 54
Canadian and Swiss law share a great deal of conformity re-
garding the acceptance of a foreign court's jurisdiction. Never-
theless, even a preliminary review of these legal systems reveals
certain differences in jurisdictional requirements. The Canadian
common law practice of acquiring jurisdiction solely on the service
of process within the forum state (the "transient rule") 55 would, in
the eyes of a Swiss court, presumably fail as a basis of jurisdiction
in the- international context. On the other hand, the assumption of
ment - Real and Substantial Connection. Morguard Investments Ltd. v. De Savoye, 70
CAN. B. REV. 733 (1991); see also E.R. Edinger, Morguard v. De Savoye: Subsequent De-
velopments, 22 CAN. BUS. L.J. 29 (1993).
49. Moses v. Shore Boat Builders Ltd. [1993] D.L.R. 654.
50. See Hunt v. T&N plc. [1993] S.C.R. 289; see also Catherine Walsh, Conflict of
Laws - Enforcement of Extra Provincial Judgments and in personam Jurisdiction of Cana-
dian Courts: Hunt v. T&N pic, 73 CAN. B. REV. 394 (1994).
51. Those fields of law include: Law of Persons, Family Law, Inheritance and Succes-
sion Law, Real Rights, Intellectual Property, Contract Law, Tort Law, Company Law,
Bankruptcy Law, and International Arbitration.
52. See SR 291 art. 26(a).
53. See id. art. 26(b)-(c).
54. See id art. 26(d).
55. See Forbes v. Simmons [19141 Alta. L.R. 87; but see Sharpe, supra note 41, at 648.
1999]
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jurisdiction in a suit seeking to enforce an order attaching Cana-
dian-held assets56 would probably be considered exorbitant under
Canadian law.
Notwithstanding these complications, this Article investigates
and develops the law only. in those cases where the international
jurisdiction of the original court is not in question.
3. Public Policy
Even where a foreign court's jurisdiction is clear, some courts
will refuse to recognize and enforce a judgment that violates their
public policy.57 The public policy exception in private interna-
tional law has been described as a "safety valve" 58 that allows
courts to refuse recognition of a foreign judgment where enforce-
ment conflicts with the forum state's fundamental concepts of jus-
tice.59 The public policy exception comes into play where the ap-
plication of a foreign law, or the enforcement of a foreign
judgment, would lead to an unacceptable result. The goal of pub-
lic policy is to protect a state's fundamental values and principles.
According to Mosconi, the public policy exception is rooted in the
body of the international law rules that define and safeguard state
sovereignty.
60
The public policy exception focuses on the result of the litiga-
tion. If the outcome of a foreign suit violates a state's fundamental
notions of justice and fairness, the state will refuse enforcement. 61
56. See SR 291 art. 4.
57. In Switzerland, the French term ordre public is common. See SR 291 art. 27(1).
For a comparison of the two expressions, see Franco Mosconi, Exceptions to the Operation
of Choice of Law Rules, in RECUEIL DES COURS 13, 23-25 (1989). In this Article, how-
ever, the expression "public policy" will be used.
58. See Sharpe, supra note 41, at 685.
59. Or, to use other descriptions, contrary to "essential public or moral interest," or
contrary to the "conception of essential justice and morality." CASTEL, supra note 2, at
163. Castel properly states that it is almost impossible to give a precise definition of public
policy. Id.
60. See Mosconi, supra note 57, at 20.
61. An example of an incorrect application of the principle can be found in BGE 88 I
48. The Swiss Supreme Court refused to recognize a divorce based on talak. Talak is the
repudiation of a wife under Islamic law. It is generally considered valid grounds for di-
vorce. After the Egyptian consul in Moscow performed a divorce, a Swiss court denied
the wife's request to transcribe the divorce into Swiss public records. The Swiss Court
held that a divorce on such grounds went against public policy. As a result, the husband
was divorced under Egyptian law, whereas the wife, a Swiss citizen, had to initiate new
divorce proceedings in Switzerland. The court evaluated the foreign law abstractly instead
of looking at the actual result. See Vischer, supra note 5, at 101.
[Vol. 21:55
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Mere disagreement with the foreign state's procedural, substan-
tive, or conflicts rules, however, is an insufficient reason to invoke
public policy. With respect to the international enforcement of
foreign judgments, the public policy defense is usually interpreted
very narrowly. Enforcement of a foreign judgment should only be
refused if it is "contrary to... conceptions of essential justice and
morality." 6
2
Other than these references to morality, fairness, and justice,
the public policy exception has also been recognized as a means to
protect domestic economic interests against the egoistic or coer-
cive measures of foreign states.63 Public policy considerations also
find expression in specific legislation64 and statutory provisions65
that deal with the enforcement of foreign judgments or the appli-
cation of foreign law.6
6
Swiss law recognizes that the intensity of the public policy ex-
ception varies depending upon the local or personal connections
between the case and Switzerland. 67 The more distant the connec-
tion of a case to the Swiss forum, the narrower the application of
the exception. Further, application of the exception depends on
62. National Surety Co. v. Larsen [1929] D.L.R. 918,920.
63. See BGE 64 II 98; IPRG KOMMENTAR, supra note 2, at 181.
64. See Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, R.S.C., ch. F-29, § 8(1) (1985) (Can.),
reprinted in 24 ILM 794. It reads as follows:
Where a foreign tribunal has ... given a judgment in proceedings instituted un-
der antitrust law and, in the opinion of the Attorney General of Canada, the
recognition or enforcement of the judgment in Canada has adversely affected or
is likely to adversely affect significant Canadian interests in relation to interna-
tional trade or commerce involving a business carried on in whole or in part in
Canada or otherwise has infringed or is likely to infringe Canadian sovereignty,
he may: (a) in the case of any judgment, by order declare that the judgment
shall not be recognized or enforceable in any manner in Canada; or (b) in the
case of a judgment for a specified amount of money, by order declare that, for
the purposes of the recognition and enforcement of the judgment in Canada, the
amount of the judgment shall be deemed to be reduced to such amount as is
specified in the order.
See, e.g., SR 211.412.4.
65. See Competition Act, R.S.C., ch. 19 J-G, § 82 (1985) (Can.); CASTEL, supra note
2, at 296.
66. SR 291 article 135(2) provides: "If claims based on a defect or defective descrip-
tion of a product are governed by foreign law, no damages can be awarded in Switzerland
beyond those that would be awarded under Swiss law for such a damage or injury." SR
291 article 137(2) provides a similar rule regarding the application of foreign law to claims
of competition restraint. See IPRG KOMMENTAR, supra note 2, at 285.
67. This principle is called "Binnenbeziehung." See IPRG KOMMENTAR, supra note
2, at 186; Mosconi, supra note 57, at 98.
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whether the case deals with the direct application of foreign law or
the recognition and/or enforcement of a foreign judgment. In the
latter, the court is asked to apply the public policy doctrine with
more restraint, 68 since the foreign court has already authoritatively
decided the matter. Non-recognition would disregard the res judi-
cata effect created by the foreign judgment and lead to a "limping"
legal relation.69 Accordingly, the Federal Supreme Court of Swit-
zerland held:
La r6serve de l'ordre public, en tant que clause d'exception,
doit 6tre interpr~tre de manire restrictive. I1 en va tout sprci-
alement ainsi en mati~re de reconnaissance et d'exrcution de
jugements 6trangers oii l'on a affaire A des rapports juridiques
qui ont force de chose jug6e ou qui sont d6finitivement acquis A
l'dtranger. En refusant de les reconnaitre en Suisse, on crderait
des rapports juridiques boiteux. C'est pourquoi on ne peut in-
voquer la reserve de l'ordre public Suisse que si la contradiction
avec le sentiment Suisse du droit et des moeurs est s6rieuse.
Autrement dit, la reconaissance constitute la r~gle, dont il ne
faut pas s'6carter sans de bonnes raisons. (citations omitted).70
The Swiss Federal Supreme Court has often considered the
non-enforcement of foreign public law as arising out of the princi-
ple of territoriality, and sometimes as an application of the public
policy exception. 71 A clear distinction has not been made. Under
Canadian law, the rule of non-enforcement of foreign penal and
tax laws is also sometimes considered to fall within the public pol-
icy exception.7
2
If, however, the rule is covered by public policy, it is a rather
atypical application of the principle because the rule applies irre-
spective of the result of the case. This is true for Canadian as well
as Swiss law. With regard to this non-enforcement rule there is no
68. Adopting the French doctrine of "ordre public attnug de la reconnaissance," see
IPRG KOMMENTAR, supra note 2, at 188. But see Y. SCHWANDER, EINFOHRUNG IN DAS
INTERNATIONALE PRIVATRECHT 333 (1990).
69. Note that SR 291 article 27(1) requires that the foreign judgment must be clearly
incompatible with Swiss public policy, whereas the public policy exception of SR 291 arti-
cle 17 lacks this special qualification.
70. BGE 116 II 625,630.
71. See BGE 42 11179; BGE 60 II 294; BGE 64 II 88; BGE 68 II 203; BGE 81196;
BGE 95 II 209; BGE 107 11492.
72. See, e.g., Van deMark v. Toronto-Dominion Bank [1989] O.R.2d 379; For a dis-
cussion on enforcement of foreign penal and tax laws under the title "Public Policy," see
Sharpe, supra note 41, at 684-89.
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moral judgment or interest analysis involved.
4. Natural Justice
Under Swiss law, public policy allows the court to refuse en-
forcement if the foreign procedure violates the essential principles
of Swiss procedural law (procedural ordre public). 73 For instance,
from the Swiss perspective, the right to be heard is of crucial im-
portance. This right has its basis in Section 4 of the Swiss Consti-
tution and in Article 6(1) of the European Convention of Human
Rights. While violation of procedural public policy is often in-
voked, it rarely succeeds.
74
The corresponding requirement under Canadian law is
whether the foreign proceedings are in accordance with natural
justice.75 The question is not whether the foreign procedure dif-
fers. from Canadian procedure, or that the foreign rule has been
applied incorrectly. Instead, the question concerns whether the
party had the opportunity to present, and properly defend, its case
before the foreign tribunal.
II. CANADIAN ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS BASED ON
FOREIGN PUBLIC LAW
Castel states the following:
In principle, the courts of a common law province or territory
will not enforce a foreign penal law or judgment, either directly
or indirectly.76
Laws that are enforced by a foreign state as an assertion of sov-
ereign power, such as anti-trust and regulation of competition
laws, securities legislation, trading with the enemy legislation,
requisition, confiscation, expropriation or nationalization laws
and decrees, and national security laws may not always be rec-
ognized and enforced by Canadian courts if they are of a politi-
cal nature.
77
73. See SR 291 art. 27(2)(b).
74. See IPRG KOMMENTAR, supra note 2, at 290.
75. See generally CASTEL, supra note 2, at 272-273. See generally Sharpe, supra note
41, at 677-684. For a recent case where the natural justice defense was unsuccessfully in-
voked, see Ivey [1995] D.L.R. at 690-93.
76. CASTEL, supra note 2, at 161.
77. Id. at 163.
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As Canadian courts will not entertain an action for the en-
forcement, either directly or indirectly, of a foreign penal or
revenue law, they will not enforce a foreign judgment ordering
the payment of taxes or penalties.
78
Dicey and Morris declare the following rules:
Rule 3: English courts have no jurisdiction to entertain an ac-
tion:
(1) for the enforcement, either directly or indirectly, of a penal,
revenue or other public law of a foreign State; or
(2) founded upon an act of state.
79
Rule 36 (1) states that a foreign judgment may be enforced if
the judgment is
(a) for a debt, or a definite sum of money (not being a sum pay-
able in respect of taxes or other charges of a like nature or in
respect of a fine or other penalty).
80
A. Non-Enforcement of Foreign Penal Judgments
The principle of non-enforcement of foreign penal judgments
was recognized as early as 1789.81 In Folliott v. Ogden, Lord
Loughborough pointed out that "[t]he penal laws in foreign coun-
tries are strictly local, and affect nothing more than they can reach
and can be seized by virtue of their authority."
82
Huntington v. Attrill is the leading authority for the non-
enforcement of foreign penal judgments. 83 In this case, an indi-
vidual plaintiff sought enforcement in Maryland of a New York
judgment ordering the defendant to pay $100,240. The claim was
based on a New York statute that imposed personal liability on di-
rectors and officers for company debts where they had made false
representations. In opposing enforcement, the defendant argued
that the judgment was a penalty inflicted by a foreign jurisdiction,
and as such should not be enforced by the courts of a foreign state.
78. Id. at 275.
79. DICEY AND MORRIS, supra note 2.
80. Id.
81. See Sharpe, supra note 41, at 688 n.209.
82. Folliott v. Ogdon , 126 Eng. Rep. 75, 82 (1789).
83. Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657 (1892).
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While New York considered the law to be penal in nature, the
Huntington court held that the characterization 84 of the foreign
law must be done in accordance with the principles of lex fori, or
forum state.
85
The court determined for itself, in the first place, the sub-
stance of the right sought to be enforced; and, in the second place,
whether its enforcement would, either directly or indirectly, in-
volve the execution of the penal law of another state. Were any
other principle to guide its decision, a court might find itself in the
position of giving effect in one case and denying effect in another,
to suits of the same character, in consequence of the causes of ac-
tion having arisen in different countries; or in the predicament of
being constrained to give effect to laws which were, in its own
judgment, strictly penal.
86
Having decided on the question of how to characterize a for-
eign law, the court noted:
The rule [of non-enforcement of foreign penal laws] has its
foundation in the well-recognized principle that crimes, includ-
ing in that term all breaches of public law punishable by pecu-
niary mulct or otherwise, at the instance of the State Govern-
ment, or of some one representing the public, are local in this
sense that they are only cognizable and punishable in the coun-
try where they were committed. Accordingly, no proceedings,
even in the shape of a civil suit, which has for its object the en-
forcement by the State, whether directly or indirectly, of pun-
ishment imposed for such breaches by the lex fori, ought to be
admitted in the Courts of any other country.
87
The court further stated that the phrase "penal actions" did not
provide an accurate definition and stated:
In its ordinary acceptation, the word "penal" may embrace
penalties for infractions of general law which do not constitute
offences against the State; it may for many legal purposes be
applied with perfect propriety to penalties created by contract;
84. This process is sometimes described as "classification." In Switzerland, the term
Qualifikation is common (French: "qualification").
85. Theoretically, there are three, maybe four, conceivable approaches: characteriza-
tion according to (1) principles of public international law; (2) the rendition state's law; (3)
the enforcing state's rules, or (4) a combination of (2) and (3). See F.A. MANN, supra note
17, at 362; see also F.A. Mann, Note, Any Civil or Commercial Matter, 102 L.Q. Rev. 505,
507 (1986).
86. Huntington, 146 U.S. at 682-83.
87. d at 681.
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and it therefore, when taken by itself, fails to mark that distinc-
tion between civil rights and criminal wrongs which is the very
essence of the international rule.
88
The Privy Council made clear that a penal suit in this sense
must be a suit in favor of the State for the recovery of pecuniary
penalties. 89 Therefore, the conclusion can be drawn that the term
"penal law" does not include statutory remedies conferred upon
individuals,90 but simply describes a forum's substantive criminal
law. A penal judgment in this sense is the result of proceedings
initiated by a state, under criminal procedural rules, with the goal
of punishing a wrongdoer by imprisonment or fine payable to the
state.
Consequently, punitive or multiple damages awarded to pri-
vate litigants in civil proceedings, would be enforceable under Ca-
nadian law.9 1 This view is endorsed by the Canadian courts' prac-
tice of awarding punitive damages for despicable conduct,
although only under very narrow circumstances. 92
It is submitted, however, that an analysis of the purposes of
punitive damages might lead to a different result. By definition,
8& Id.
89. See id. The Council adopts a definition given by the U.S. Supreme Court in Wis-
consin v. The Pelican Co., 127 U.S. 265 (1888).
90. See Sharpe, supra note 41, at 688.
91. There may be no Canadian case law explicitly confirming this opinion. In Four
Embarcadero Ctr. Venture v. Kalen [1988] O.R.2d 551,557, the High Court of Justice held
that the allegations of the defendant that the default judgment included an award of ex-
emplary damages did not raise an issue of public policy since it is not a foreign state recov-
ering a penalty. See id. at 574. In the English case, Raulin v. Fischer, 2 K.B. 93 (1911), the
civil damage portion of a combined civil/penal condemnation has been enforced. In an-
other English case, SA Consortium General Textiles v. Sun and Sand Agencies Ltd., Q.B.
279 (1978), the court enforced a French judgment including Ffr 10,000 damages for "rdsis-
tance abusive" (unjustifiable opposition). Lord Denning M.R. held that there is "nothing
contrary to English public policy in enforcing a claim for exemplary damages .. " Id. at
300. Additionally, "[plenalizing the defendant by the award of punitive damages to the
plaintiff is, however, by no means unknown to the legal systems derived from English law,
and if the plaintiff keeps the damage for himself, this, it is submitted, may be decisive."
F.A. MANN, supra note 17, at 364.
92. Vorvis v. Insurance Corp. of British Columbia [1989] D.L.R. 193, 208, states:
[P]unitive damages may only be awarded in respect of conduct which is of such a
nature as to be deserving of punishment because of its harsh, vindictive, repre-
hensible and malicious nature. I do not suggest that I have exhausted the adjec-
tives which could describe the conduct capable of characterizing a punitive
award, but in any case where such an award is made the conduct must be ex-
treme in its nature and such that by any reasonable standard it is deserving of
full condemnation and punishment.
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punitive damages go beyond compensation and aim to punish the
wrongdoer.93 In addition to the function of punishment, punitive
damages are designed to deter undesirable behavior. Deterrence
may be both specific (to prevent the defendant from repeating the
offence) and general (to prevent others from committing similar
offenses). 94 Punishment and deterrence are also the main features
of criminal law and thus, based on this functional approach, puni-
tive damages could be regarded as part of the penal law. Punitive
damages, however, are merely "aspects" of penal law and there-
fore the penal law rule should not be applied to judgments award-
ing punitive damages.
95
In the United States, statutes like the Clayton Act (anti-
trust)96 and the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO)97 expressly provide multiple damages for individual plain-
tiffs. Canada's Foreign Extraterritorial Measurements Act, how-
ever, specifically prevents enforcement of such decisions. 98 The
following is a brief discussion of treble damages under RICO.
In 1970, the U.S. Congress enacted RICO to eradicate organ-
ized crime in the United States. The act identifies certain predi-
cate acts which give rise to liability when they occur in a pattern
93. See S.M. WADDAMS, THE LAW OF CONTRACrS 509 (3d ed. 1993); S.M.
WADDAMS, THE LAW OF DAMAGES 11.10, 11.20 (2d ed. 1991); Norberg v. Wynrib [1992]
D.L.R. 449,469.
94. A U.S. commentator has identified other purposes of punitive damages as ex-
pressed in judicial opinions and commentaries: preservation of the peace, inducement for
private law enforcement, compensation to victims for otherwise uncompensable losses,
and reimbursement of plaintiff's attorney's fees. See D. Ellis, Fairness and Efficiency in
the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 3 (1982).
95. If the punitive damages have been assessed in an outrageous manner, however,
the punitive damages portion of a judgment could be regarded as violating fundamental
notions of justice and fairness, and thus also violating Canada's public policy. Neverthe-
less, courts are reluctant to apply the public policy doctrine, even though the foreign
judgment may greatly exceed the limits of an award in Canada. See, e.g., Stoddard v. Ac-
curpress Mfg. Ltd. [1993] B.C.L.R.2d 194, 204-05. A recent example of what seems to be
an outrageous assessment was when a Mississippi jury awarded 500 million U.S. dollars in
punitive damages where the actual reported claim for compensation was less than ten mil-
lion U.S. dollars. See David Baines, B.C. Funeral Firm Settles Suit for $85 Milion. Out-of-
Court Deal With U.S. Company Saved the Loewen Group from Bankruptcy, THE
VANCOUVER SUN, Jan. 30, 1996, at Al.
96. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1982).
97. See Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organization Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-
68 (1998).
98. See Competition Act, R.S.C., ch. 19 J-G, § 82. There are no readily available
cases where the Attorney General made an order pursuant to the Act.
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relationship. 99 RICO broadly defines predicate acts to include the
federal mail and wire fraud statutes. This leads to a potentially
broad application of RICO. Additionally, RICO grants a private
right of action to anyone injured by a RICO-violation. 10 0 RICO
plaintiffs may recover treble damages, costs, and attorney's fees.101
RICO's legislative history reveals that the treble damages provi-
sions were intended to encourage citizens to supplement state en-
forcement measures with private suits.102 This is the so-called
"private Attorney General" role of civil RICO plaintiffs. 10 3 Thus,
it is highly formulaic to deny a defendant the "non-enforcement of
foreign penal laws" defense simply because a private plaintiff is
seeking enforcement. In essence, although the state chose to cre-
ate a statutory incentive for private plaintiffs to enforce public in-
terests, it is essentially a case of a foreign state enforcing its rights.
In conclusion, the rule of non-enforcement of foreign penal
judgments is clear as long as the plaintiff is a foreign state. In cases
where an individual plaintiff demands the enforcement of a civil
judgment including a penal award, courts have generally granted
enforcement. 10 4 In other cases where a plaintiff acts as a "private
attorney-general who protects the public interests," 105 the en-
forcement could be refused on the grounds that it is actually the
state, acting through a private person or corporation, asserting ex-
traterritorial enforcement of penal laws. This view, which rejects
the formalistic approach of asking "who is the plaintiff?", allows
for the preclusion of enforcement of penal awards on a case by
case basis.
B. Non-Enforcement of Foreign Tax Judgments
In United States v. Harden,10 6 the Canadian Supreme Court
held that the British Colombian courts lacked jurisdiction to both
entertain an action for the recovery of foreign taxes and to enforce
foreign tax judgments. This is true even in the case of a consent
99. See M.A. DiMedio, A Deterrence Theory Analysis of Corporate RICO Liability
for "Fraud in the Sale of Securities", 1 GEO. MASON L. REV. 135 (1994).
100. See id. at 135.
101. See id. at 137-38.
102. Id. at 143.
103. See id at 155.
104. See Norberg, D.L.R. 449.
105. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 460.
106. United States v. Harden [1963] S.C.R. 366.
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judgment bearing the characteristics of an agreement. About fif-
teen years later, the roles were reversed when the province of
British Columbia sought to enforce logging taxes against U.S. resi-
dents. 10 7 In Gilbertson, the court held that the non-enforcement
rule was still in effect, and there was no reciprocity between Brit-
ish Columbia and the United States. 10 8  The rule of non-
enforcement of foreign tax laws is well-established by authority,
but has been severely criticized, 10 9 especially with respect to its
application in the interprovincial context.
Canadian courts have also denied the indirect enforcement of
foreign tax claims. An illustrative example of this rule is the case
of Van deMark v. Toronto-Dominion Bank.110 In this case, the
U.S. Internal Revenue Service served notices of levy upon the
New York offices of the defendant bank. The IRS alleged that
Van de Mark held funds as a nominee of his parents who were in-
debted to the United States for tax arrears. Subsequently, the
bank froze Van de Mark's assets at two Toronto branches. Van de
Mark then applied for an order requiring the bank to pay out the
moneys held on his behalf. The court held:
[I]t is a well-established rule of public policy that Canadian law
forbids a foreign state from suing, either directly or indirectly,
in Canada for taxes alleged to be due to the state. To permit
the Ontario branches of the bank to defend the applicant's
claim on the basis of the bank's liability in the United States,
would be to enforce indirectly a claim for taxes by a foreign
state.111
In Re Reid,112 the court held that a trustee was entitled to in-
demnification for taxes he had already paid, even though it was a
foreign tax that would be unenforceable under Canadian law. The
court held that the determination of a private suit was at issue, and
107. See R. v. Gilbertson, 597 F.2d 1161 (1983).
108. See id& at 1166. It should be noted that since January 1996, Canada and the
United States mutually enforce revenue claims that are final determinations by the other
country. See Article XXVI.A ("Assistance in Collection") of the Third Protocol amend-
ing the Convention between Canada and the United States with respect to taxes on In-
come and on Capital (signed on Sept. 26, 1980). Harden, however, still expresses the state
of law with respect to foreign tax judgments if there is no international arrangement to this
effect. See Harden [1963] S.C.R. 366.
109. See Castel, Tax Claims, supra note 33, at 277.
110. See Van deMark v. Toronto-Dominion Bank [1989] O.R.2d 379.
111. I&
112. Re Reid [1970] D.L.R.3d 199.
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not the indirect enforcement of a foreign tax.113  Therefore,
granting the indemnification would not enrich the foreign treasury.
On the other hand, the English case of Peter Buchanan Ltd. v.
McVey 1 4 considered a liquidator's claim against a director or
shareholder for the recovery of sums paid as foreign taxes. The
Buchanan court held that collection would be an indirect enforce-
ment of foreign tax laws. Judge Kingsmill Moore wrote:
[I]f I am right in attributing such importance to the principle,
then it is clear that its enforcement must not depend merely on
the form in which the claim is made. It is not a question
whether the plaintiff is a foreign State or the representative of a
foreign State or its revenue authority. In every case the sub-
stance of the claim must be scrutinized, and if it then appears
that it is really a suit brought for the purpose of collecting debts
of a foreign revenue it must be rejected. 115
Kingsmill put great weight on the fact that the sole object of
the suit was the collection of foreign taxes. Thus, there were no
other unpaid creditors, and the liquidator was assigned to "chase
the tax" for the exclusive benefit of the tax authorities. 116 This tax
rule, however, is less strictly applied when a liquidator seeks the
mere transfer of assets, even though part of these assets will be
used to pay taxes.117
In 1775, Lord Mansfield stated, by way of dictum, that "no
country ever takes notice of the revenue laws of another. 11 8 The
exclusion of foreign tax law, however, is not absolute. Thus, Ca-
nadian courts would probably take notice of foreign tax law if it
rendered a contract void under specific tax provisions. 119 In such a
case, the claim or judgment is based on a contractual relation.
Again, the non-enforcement rule finds its application only in cases
where the lex causae is a foreign tax law.
113. Id.
114. Peter Buchanan Ltd. v. McVey [1955] A.C. 516
115. Id. at 529.
116. See F. A. MANN, supra note 17, at 375 (considering Peter Buchanan Ltd. v. McVey
as an obvious case of indirect enforcement of foreign tax laws). Of course, indirect en-
forcement would not be allowed.
117. See Baade, supra note 27, at 44 (indicating that a great deal of uncertainty exists in
this regard).
118. Holman v. Johnson [1775] Eng. Rep. 1120.
119. See P.M. NORTH & J.J. FAWCETT, CHESHIRE AND NORTH'S PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW 117 (12th ed. 1992).
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In Re Sefel Geophysical Ltd.,120 a bankruptcy trustee applied
for guidance in the administration of a complex estate. The issue
was "[w]hether United States claims and United Kingdom claims,
similar in nature to Canadian Crown claims, are to be considered
preferred, unsecured, or disallowed.
' 121
The claims included, inter alia, claims for foreign taxes. The
court noted that the prior cases, Government of India v. Taylor
122
and U.S.A. v. Harden123, have created a hurdle by holding that
courts will not enforce foreign revenue claims.
124
Cases were cited in support of the proposition that claims
proven in bankruptcy must be claims that would be enforceable by
a court. Re Morton f5 illustrates that statute barred claims are not
provable. The same syllogistic conclusion is urged in the case of
revenue claims which are barred by the holding in U.S.A. v.
Harden. In fact, Government of India v. Taylor is specific author-
ity for the principle that foreign revenue claims are not provable in
a liquidation setting. Given the present trends of international
comity in the recognition of foreign bankruptcy proceedings, how-
ever, I am not certain that the Government of India case is com-
patible with the current judicial climate.
126
Judge Forsyth continued:
If our bankruptcy proceedings are respected and deferred to, as
they were in the case at bar, I am of the opinion that the claims
of foreign states should be respected in our proceedings as long
as they are of a type that accords with general Canadian con-
cepts of fairness and decency in state imposed burdens.
I specially restrict my opinion to the special case of liquidation
proceedings. The underlying consideration in a liquidation set-
ting are significantly different from those in a setting where the
action is simply one on a tax judgment as in U.S.A. v. Harden. I
can find no authority within Canada that binds me with respect
to the holding in Government of India v. Taylor.
127
120. Re Sefel Geophysical Ltd. [1988] D.L.R. Lexis 1504.
121. See id. at 1505.
122. Government of India v. Taylor [1955] A.C. 491 (H.L.).
123. U.S.A. v. Harden [1963] S.C.R. 366.
124. See Re Sefel Geophysical Ltd. [1998] D.L.R. Lexis at 1509.
125. Re Morton [1922] 3 C.B.R. 114 (Sask. K.B.).
126. Id. at 1510-11.
127. Id. at 1511.
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Based thereon, the court allowed the foreign tax claims, and
by doing so, enforced foreign tax claims. With regard to the U.S.
claims, the court held that the estate had been enriched by U.S. as-
sets, and that equity demanded recognition of the foreign claim as
preferred. As for the U.K. claims, the court found that no U.K. as-
sets had been recovered, and therefore the claims should be rec-
ognized as claims of general creditors.
128
The court expressly restricted its opinion to the special case of
liquidation proceedings, where the underlying considerations are
significantly different from those where the action is simply based
on a tax judgment. The opinion, however, neglected to explain the
basis for this distinction. In fact, there is no clear basis for a less
stringent application of the tax rule in liquidation proceedings. In-
terestingly, the court relied on the principle of comity as the basis
for a more generous attitude towards the recognition and en-
forcement of foreign claims.129 Without expressly mentioning it,
the court also heavily relied on the principle of reciprocity. Fi-
nally, it should be noted that the court applied a public policy test,
when it stated that foreign claims should be respected "as long as
they are of a type that accords with general Canadian concepts of
fairness and decency in state imposed burdens." 130
The rule of non-enforcement of foreign tax judgments is in-
deed well-established, and its application does not bear great un-
certainties. There is no "middle ground" discernible as there is re-
garding penal matters. Also, the Canadian-U.S. tax convention
demonstrates that an international treaty may be necessary to al-
low the enforcement of foreign tax judgments. While Re Sefel
Geophysical Ltd.131 opened the way to a more favorable enforce-
ment practice, one should remember that the facts of the case were
unusual. The assets of the bankrupt company had been trans-
ferred from the United States to Canada by a U.S. court order.
Under these circumstances, it would have been most offensive to
disallow the U.S. revenue claims.
128. For U.S. claims, see id. at 1512-13. For U.K. claims, see id. at 1513-14.
129. See discussion infra Part IV.D.1.
130. Re Sefel Geophysical Ltd. [1989] A.R. at 1511.
131. See id.
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C. Non-Enforcement of "Other Public Law"
While the law regarding the non-enforcement of foreign
judgments based on penal and tax laws is more or less settled, un-
certainties exist whether this rule should extend to the entire body
of public law. 132 Thus, some courts will construe the words "pe-
nal" and "revenue" laws as generic terms into which every "suspi-
cious" public right has to be pressed.
133
The public law exception was pronounced by Denning M.R.
in New Zealand (Attorney General) v. Ortiz.134 Ortiz involved an
attempt to enforce a New Zealand statute providing for the forfei-
ture of "historical articles" exported (or attempted to be exported)
in violation of the statute. M.R. Denning concluded that the as-
serted rights under the statute were an exercise of sovereignty be-
yond the territory of New Zealand and therefore fell into the cate-
gory of non-enforceable public law.
135
The following sections examine the various fields of law that
are generally considered public law. Also, since Canadian author-
ity on the point is sparse, I will consider cases from other common
law jurisdictions.
132. See discussion in DICEY AND MORRIS, supra note 2, at 106-09. See also NORTH
AND FAWCETr, supra note 119 (finding the "public law" category as "firmly established"
although "difficult to define"); see also id. at 122, 381--82. "It is a well established rule that
our courts will not enforce a foreign revenue, penal or public law." R. v. Pentonville
Prison Governor, ex parte Budlong [1980] W.L.R. 1110, 1125. Kerr L.J. characterized the
principle as "general international acceptation." See In re State of Norway's Application
[1987] Q.B. 433, 478. But it seems that Canadian law has never adopted the public law
exception. See, e.g., supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text (avoiding the term "public
law").
133. See, e.g., Weir v. Lohr [1967] D.L.R. 717, and Schemmer v. Property Resources
Ltd., 1975 Ch. 273 (Eng.); F.A. MANN, supra note 17, at 358.
134. See New Zealand v. Ortiz [1984] A.C. 1. M.R. Denning described the principle of
non-enforcement of foreign public law as a rule "no one has ever doubted." Id
135. See id. at 24. The House of Lords affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeal,
but solely on the ground that the New Zealander had not become owner of the article, be-
cause the forfeiture is not complete until seizure (which had never happened). See Ortiz,
A.C. 35. The House of Lords expressly declared that Lord Denning's opinion on the pub-
lic law exception were obiter and did not comment on the public law rule at all. See id. at
46. Other cases where the public law argument was discussed as a third category of non-
enforceable claims are Attorney General v. Heinemann Publishers Australia Pty. Ltd.
[1988] C.L.R. 30 and Attorney-General for the United Kingdom v. Wellington Newspa-
pers Ltd. [1988] N.Z.L.R. 129.
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1. Recognition of Bankruptcy Decrees
Canada's Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act 3 6 does not contain
any provisions dealing with the effect of a foreign bankruptcy's as-
signment of Canadian property. 137 In the common law provinces,
a foreign trustee's title will be recognized with respect to mov-
ables, if, in the eyes of Canadian law, the foreign court had prop-
erly assumed jurisdiction.
138
Thus, with regard to Canadian movables, Canadian law rec-
ognizes both the appointment and seizure power of a trustee em-
powered by foreign bankruptcy law. Bankruptcy laws are a typical
example of a state's exercise of the "monopoly of legitimate coer-
cive power,"'139 and their effects are comparable to confiscation
laws. The purpose of bankruptcy law, however, is best understood
as a means to satisfy unpaid debts, rather than as an assertion of
foreign sovereign power.
2. Judgments for Costs
In Deutsche Nemectron GmbH v. Dolker,140 the plaintiff
sought Canadian enforcement of a German court order granting
indemnification for German court costs. The plaintiff company
had obtained this order after the defendant unsuccessfully initiated
proceedings against the plaintiff in Germany. The court consid-
ered, but ultimately rejected the tax argument. The Dolker court
held that the German court costs are "certainly not tantamount to
taxation by a foreign state. '' 141 The court did not address the pub-
lic law argument, even though German public law provided the ba-
sis for the German court order. Instead, the court found that the
German court order was within the definition of "judgment" under
the Court Order Enforcement Act142 and granted the plaintiff's
application.
136. The Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C., ch. B-3 (1985) (Can.).
137. See CASTEL, supra note 2, at 530.
138. See id
139. Translation of "Monopol legitimer Gewaltsamkeit," found in MAX WEBER,
WIRTSCHAFT UND GESELLSCHAFT II, at 829-30 (4th ed. 1956).
140. See Deutsche Nemectron GmbH v. Dolker [1984] B.C.L.R. 162.
141. Id. at 165.
142. Court Order Enforcement Act, R.S.C., ch. 75, § 30(1) (1979) (Can.). The order
defines "judgment" as "a judgment or order of a court in a civil proceeding, where money
is made payable." See Deutsche Nemectron GmbH B.C.L.R. at 165.
[Vol. 21:55
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
While I believe the outcome of the case is correct, the clearly
compensatory nature of the German court order should have de-
cided the issue.
3. Subrogation Claims in Social Security Matters
143
In Weir v. Lohr, 144 the plaintiff was injured in an automobile
accident. His hospital bill was paid for by the Minister of Public
Health pursuant to the Manitoba Hospitalization Act.145 This Act
required the plaintiff to recompense the Minister from any recov-
ery resulting from a claim against the tortfeasor. 146 Furthermore,
the Act provided that the Minister of Public Health should be sub-
rogated to all rights of recovery. 147 The plaintiff brought an action
against the defendant in Manitoba (where the latter was domi-
ciled) for the hospitalization costs.
The defendant argued that the suit was an inappropriate at-
tempt to enforce a "foreign" (i.e., extra-provincial) revenue claim.
While the court was clearly correct in not characterizing the claim
as a tax,148 the court also justified the denial of the defense by
holding that sister provinces of Canada are not foreign states. 149
The court did not consider the public law argument, but it would
have been rejected nevertheless under the second argument of the
court.
4. Enforcement of Securities Laws
U.S. securities laws are of primary interest because the U.S.
financial markets are the largest, and probably the most highly
regulated in the world. 150 They comprise six federal statutes, of
which the Securities Act of 1933151 and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (the "1934 Act") 152 are of great significance. The 1934
Act prohibits fraud in the purchase and sale of securities, requires
143. At the time of this writing the author could not find a case dealing with the en-
forcement of a social security judgment or direct application of a foreign social security
law as the lex causae.
144. Weir v. Lohr [1967] 65 D.L.R.2d 717.
145. See id. at 718.
146. See id.
147. See id. at 718-19.
148. See id. at 720.
149. See id. at 721-23.
150. See Lowenfeld, supra note 3, at 344.
151. See Securities Exchange Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1998).
152. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1998).
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corporations listed on U.S. stock exchanges to file periodic reports
to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and states cer-
tain minimum requirements for broker-dealers. The SEC is an in-
dependent agency established by section 4(a) of the 1934 Act,
charged with the duty of administering the federal securities laws
and enforcing the applicable anti-fraud provisions. The SEC is
primarily responsible for protecting investors in securities and the
general public interest. 153 The SEC's powers to impose sanctions
for violations of the securities laws have been summarized as fol-
lows:
The two functions of the Commission are the investigation of
possible illegal activity and the adjudication of alleged viola-
tions. To this end, the Commission may bring actions in its own
name to enjoin violations of the securities laws and may refer
evidence of a criminal violation to the Attorney General, who
may institute the necessary criminal proceedings under the
law. 154
The SEC has three sets of powers concerning the imposition
of sanctions. First, it may decide whether to impose administrative
sanctions. 155 Second, it may apply to the U.S. federal courts for
the imposition of civil sanctions. 156 Third, it may assist the Attor-
ney General by providing information of relevance to a criminal
prosecution.157
In the English case Schemmer v. Property Resources Ltd., the
court held:
The Act of 1934 is, in my judgment, a penal law of the United
States of America and, as such, unenforceable in our courts. I
have read enough of it to show that it was passed for public
ends and that its purpose is to prevent and punish specified acts
and omissions which it declares to be unlawful. It was, of
course, enacted not merely in the interest of the nation as an
abstract or political entity, but to protect a class of the public.
In that it resembles the greater part of the criminal law of any
country. Like many other penal laws, the Act of 1934 also pro-
153. See 79 C.J.S. § 242 (1995).
154. Id. § 243 (1998) (citations omitted).
155. Such as issuing injunctive orders. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3 (1998). Or perhaps, re-
quiring administrative disgorgement. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-2(e), -3(e) (1998).
156. For instance, disgorgement of profits. For discussion of the enforceability of dis-
gorgement judgments, see infra Part III.D.7.
157. 15 U.S.C. § 77(b) (1998).
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vides in some cases a private remedy available to the victims of
the offences which it forbids, and it may possibly be that a pri-
vate plaintiff who recovers a judgment in a federal court under
the Act of 1934 can enforce it by action here.158
In Schemmer, the plaintiff had been appointed as a receiver
by a U.S. District Court, upon motion by the SEC. The court held
that the plaintiff was, in effect, a public officer of a foreign state at-
tempting to enforce a foreign criminal law. Therefore, his claim
was deemed unenforceable in England. 159 The court, however,
left the door open for private law claims brought by private plain-
tiffs under the 1934 Act.
160
To prevent unfair insider trading, section 16(b) of the 1934
Act provides that a corporate officer must account to the corpora-
tion for any profits made within six months of a purchase and sale
of the corporation's shares. In McIntyre Porcupine Mines Ltd. v.
Hammond,161 the plaintiff company, whose shares were listed on
the Toronto and New York Stock Exchanges, tried to enforce this
provision against the defendant officer who sold company stock on
the Toronto Stock Exchange during the critical period. The de-
fendant was a Canadian citizen, who had no business or assets in
the United States. The plaintiff company received a default judg-
ment against the defendant in a New York court. The plaintiff
then sought both enforcement of the default judgment and a new
action under section 16(b) of the 1934 Act, in the Toronto court.
The Toronto court held that the New York court lacked juris-
diction over the defendant, and that the judgment was therefore
unenforceable in Canada.162 It further held that the 1934 Act had
no extraterritorial effect, and consequently, the plaintiff had no
cause of action.163 The court briefly raised the issue of whether
158. Schemmer v. Property Resources Ltd., 1975 Ch. 273,288 (Eng.).
159. See id. The reasons provided by the court are convincing in view of the existing
framework. It may have been more convincing, however, to use the term "public laws"
instead of "penal laws," since the plaintiff did not try to enforce a punishment, but rather,
plaintiff tried to "reduce the London funds into possession in order to prevent the com-
mission or continuation of offences against [U.S.] federal law." Id.; see also F.A. MANN,
supra note 17, at 358.
160. See supra note 158 (emphasis on last sentence in quoted text).
161. See McIntyre Porcupine Mines Ltd. v. Hamond [1975] O.R.2d 452.
162. See id. at 461. For a discussion on lack of jurisdiction in the international sense,
see discussion supra Part I.E.2.
163. See McIntyre Porcupine Mines Ltd., D.L.R.3d at 147-48. It is not quite clear
whether the court, when referring to legislative jurisdiction, intended that the 1934 Act
could not be applied to conduct exclusively performed in Canada (according Canadian
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the 34 Act was a penal statute:
[I]t is unnecessary to decide whether the United States legisla-
tion is, in fact, a penal statute. Prima facie it has at least some
of the characteristics of a penal statute. If it in fact is, that
would be a further reason to refuse to countenance it in this ju-
risdiction.164
According to Castel, based on the quote above, "one must as-
sume that a judgment rendered in the United States pursuant to
the Securities and Exchange Act would not be enforced in Can-
ada."'165 This statement is too broad. As it stands, it encompasses
civil litigation between private parties, an area which the Schem-
mer case distinguished.166 McIntyre Porcupine Mines Ltd. v.
Hammond illustrates the different aspects of jurisdiction. It deals
with (judicial) jurisdiction in the international sense, with (pre-
sumably) legislative jurisdiction, and with the non-enforcement of
certain (in casu: penal) foreign laws.
5. Judgments Based on Environmental Laws
In United States v. Ivey,167 the plaintiff brought an action to
enforce two judgments it obtained against the defendants in
Michigan pursuant to the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA). 168 The
plaintiff sued for reimbursement for the cost of measures under-
taken by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in relation
to a waste disposal site in Michigan. Liquid Disposal Incorporated
(LDI), a Michigan corporation, conducted the waste disposal busi-
ness on the site. The defendant, an Ontario resident, had a con-
trolling interest in LDI and oversaw its management and opera-
tions.
CERCLA provides for the recovery of environmental clean-
up costs from a variety of parties legislatively deemed responsible
for the contamination. These include "owner and operator,"
choice of law rules), or that the 1934 Act could not be applied in general as its application
is per se limited to the U.S. judiciary.
164. I&
165. J. G. CASTEL, EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 114 (Robert
McConkey, Marie Graham, et al, eds., 1988) [hereinafter CASTEL,
EXTRATERRITORIALITY].
166. See supra note 159.
167. See Ivey [1995] D.L.R.4th 674.
168. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1980).
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which has been interpreted by the U.S. courts to include both indi-
viduals and corporations who exercise control over the disposal
site, even if title to the site is held by a distinct corporation. Li-
ability under CERCLA is strict, and defenses are very limited.
169
In enforcement proceedings before the Ontario court, Ivey
raised the following defenses: (1) the U.S. court lacked jurisdic-
tion; (2) the U.S. judgments were non-enforceable because they
were based on the "penal, revenue or other public law" of a for-
eign state; (3) the U.S. judgments were obtained in violation of the
rules of natural justice; and (4) the U.S. judgments are contrary to
public policy.1
70
Applying the real and substantial connection test established
in Morguard Investments Ltd. v. De Savoye, the court rejected the
jurisdictional challenge, 171 as well as Ivey's natural justice 172 and
public policy arguments. 173 It is worthwhile to carefully examine
the court's reasoning with respect to the penal/public law defense.
The court refused to characterize the CERCLA provisions as
penal in nature. After stating that the measure of recovery is di-
rectly tied to the cost of the clean-up of the site, the court held that
the liability "[i]s restitutionary in nature and is not imposed with a
view to punishment of the party responsible.' 174 The court re-
jected the revenue law argument on similar grounds.175 It then
went on to address the public law argument by referring to, inter
alia, New Zealand (Attorney General) v. Ortiz,176 Attorney General
v. Heinemann Publishers Australia Pty. Ltd.,177 and Attorney Gen-
eral v. Wellington Newspapers Ltd.178 After noting that Canadian
169. See Ivey, D.L.R.4th at 679.
170. See id. at 676-77.
171. See id. at 681-83; see discussion supra Part I.E.2.
172. See Ivey, D.L.R.4th at 690-92; see discussion supra Part I.E.3.
173. See Ivey, D.L.R.4th at 693-94; see discussion supra Part I.E.3.
174. Ivey, D.L.R.4th at 684.
175. See id at 685. As there is no Canadian precedent dealing with the public law ar-
gument, the counsel for the defendant probably had to plead other defenses to account for
the inability to predict how the court would consider the public law argument.
176. Ortiz, A.C. 24. Judge Sharpe pointed out that although there are dicta in English
cases which accept the public law exception, it had not received the direct approval of the
House of Lords in the Ortiz case, nor in any other case. See Ivey, D.L.R.4th at 684.
177. See Attorney General v. Heinemann Publishers Australia Pty Ltd. [1988] C.L.R.
30 (noting that the court did not approve of a general rule excluding the enforcement of
foreign public law).
178. See Attorney General of U.K. v. Wellington Newspapers, Ltd. [1988] N.Z.L.R.
129.
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authority on the point is sparse, and quoting Castel's statement on
the issue, 179 Judge Sharpe held:
In my view, the "public law" argument advanced by the defen-
dant should be rejected for two reasons. First, even if one sets
to one side the rather shaky foundation of the doctrine, the
cases which do apply the "public law" exception are distin-
guishable.
If one turns to the principle said to underlie these decisions
[purporting the public law exception], it does not apply to the
present case. The claim advanced here cannot fairly be charac-
terized as an attempt by a foreign state to assert its sovereignty
within the territory of Ontario.180
The defendants chose to engage in the waste disposal business
in the United States and the judgments at issue here go no further
than holding them to account for the cost of remedying the harm
their activity caused. 181
As a second basis for his decision, Judge Sharpe held "it
would be highly undesirable in principle to interpret and expand
the 'public law' defense to encompass the circumstances of the
case at bar."182 He referred to the fact that Ontario has also es-
tablished regulatory regimes providing for the imposition of civil
liability for such clean-up costs, and went on to say:
In this light, it is difficult to see the rationale for this court to re-
fuse enforcement on the grounds that the efforts of the plaintiff
to recover the costs it has incurred to remedy the environmental
problems at the L.D.I. site represent an illegitimate attempt to
assert sovereignty beyond its borders.
183
The court further held that the principle of comity should in-
form the development of this area of the law, and despite the fact
that there was clearly a foreign public purpose at stake, considera-
tions of comity strongly favored enforcement. 184 Finally, the court
noted that the United States enforces foreign judgments for envi-
ronmental clean-up costs. 185 The court considered this to be sig-
179. See CASTEL, supra note 2, at 163.
180. Ivey, D.L.R.4th at 688-89.
181. Id. at 689.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. See id. at 689-90.
185. See id. at 690.
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nificant with respect to the principles of comity186 and reciproc-
ity.18
7
The Ivey judgment is impressive for its careful reasoning. It
should be emphasized that Judge Sharpe did not pass judgment as
to whether the public law exception doctrine would ever apply in
Canada. Nevertheless, he carefully examined the case under this
doctrine. He finally concluded that even if the doctrine were ap-
plied, it would not lead to the non-enforcement of the U.S. judg-
ments. Clearly, a decisive factor was the fact that the statutory ba-
sis for the claim was purely remedial, and clearly distinguishable,
from a penal sanction. This was true even though the plaintiff was
a foreign state agency claiming public rights. Furthermore, it
should be noted that Judge Sharpe characterized the efforts of the
United States to recover the costs as "not an illegitimate attempt to
assert sovereignty beyond its borders." 188 Thus, we are left with
the question whether some assertion of sovereignty beyond the
borders of a foreign state may be tolerated.
189
6. Judgments Based on Competition and Anti-Trust Laws
Attempts to internationally enforce competition and anti-
trust laws face hurdles on several levels. First, questions arise as to
whether a state's legislature has jurisdiction over conduct per-
formed outside the jurisdiction when the effects are felt inside the
jurisdiction. 190 Second, a question may exist as to whether the
court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Third, whether
proceedings aimed at the enforcement of foreign anti-trust judg-
ments, including multiple damages, may fall victim to the penal
rule of non-enforcement. 191 Finally, and related to the third cate-
gory, issues of public policy and national interests are at stake.
These concerns find their legal basis in the so-called blocking stat-
utes.192
186. With respect to comity, see infra Part IV.D.1.
187. See Ivey, D.L.R.4th at 689-90.
188. Id. at 689 (emphasis added).
189. See infra Part IV.C.
190. CASTEL, EXTRATERRITORIALITY, supra note 165, at 170; Lowenfeld, supra note
3, at 326-29.
191. See supra Part II.A.
192. See Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, R.S.C., ch. F-29, § 8(1) (1985) (Can.);
Federal Statute on the Acquisition of Real Property by Person Domiciled Abroad, R.S.C.,
ch. 19, J.-G. (1985)(Can.).
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Given all of these special considerations, this field of the law
has produced its own rules193 and the public law exception is of
secondary significance.
7. National Security Matters
The cases discussed below do not concern the enforcement of
judgments, nor are they claims brought to recover a certain sum of
money. Nevertheless, due to the impact of the public law excep-
tion, they are of considerable importance for this investigation.
In Attorney General v. Heinemann Publishers Australia Pty.
Ltd.,194 the United Kingdom sought an Australian injunction to re-
strain the publication of a book containing confidential informa-
tion obtained by the author while he was a member of the British
Security Service. The claim was based upon breach of contract,
breach of fiduciary and equitable obligations, and a statutory obli-
gation of confidence imposed by the Official Secrets Act of the
United Kingdom.
195
The Australian High Court refused to grant the injunctive re-
lief on the ground that it would not "protect the intelligence se-
crets and confidential political information of the United Kingdom
Government.' ' 196 The court reviewed the authorities with regard
to the public law exception and concluded that the expression
"public laws" had no accepted meaning in Australian law. The
court went on to state that it would be more apt to refer to "public
interests" or "governmental interests" when describing the non-
enforceable foreign claims.197 The court held:
[T]he action is neither fully nor accurately described as an ac-
tion to enforce private rights or private interests of a foreign
state. It is in truth an action in which the United Kingdom
Government seeks to protect the efficiency of its Security Serv-
ice as "part of the Defence Forces of the country." The claim
for relief made by the appellant in the present proceedings
arises out of, and is secured by an exercise of prerogative of the
193. CASTEL, EXTRATERRITORIALITY, supra note 165; see, e.g., Special Defenses in
International Antitrust Litigation (1995) A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, Monograph N. 20
(representing the U.S. point of view).
194. Attorney General v. Heinenann Publishers Australia Pty. Ltd. [1988] 165 C.L.R.
30. See F.A. Mann, Note, Spycatcher in the High Court of Australia, 104 L.Q.R. 497
(1988); see Baade, supra note 27, at 39.
195. See id
196. Heinemann [1988] 165 C.L.R. at 54.
197. See id at 42.
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Crown, that exercise being the maintenance of the national se-
curity. Therefore the right or interest asserted in the proceed-
ings is to be classified as a governmental interest. As such, the
action falls within the rule of international law which renders
the claim unenforceable.
198
It is interesting to note that the New Zealand Court of Ap-
peal took a different approach when faced with the same issue.
199
It observed that, in a shrinking world, it seemed "anachronistic for
the Courts to deny themselves any power to do what they can to
safeguard the security of a friendly foreign state." 200 This was,
however, subject to the qualification that such a claim could only
be entertained if it was not contrary to the interests of the New
Zealand Government as articulated by the competent political
authorities. 20 1 Ultimately, the attempt to restrain the publication
of the book in New Zealand also failed, since the local publication




There are no precedents stating that foreign public laws are
unenforceable in Canada. In United States of America v. Ivey, the
court left open whether the "public law rule," as pronounced in
some English cases, is controlling in Canada. Thus, judgments
based on foreign public law (as the lex causae) have been enforced
in Canada,20 3 even though the plaintiff is a foreign state pursuing
public interests.20 4 All of these cases turned upon judgments
which were compensatory in nature.
198. Id. at 46-47. See F.A. MANN, supra note 17, at 358-59 (severely critiquing the
concept of "governmental interests" and holding that this concept would preclude any
state claim of whatever nature in a foreign court).
199. See Attorney-General for the U.K. v. Wellington Newspapers Ltd. [1988] 1
N.Z.L.R. 129.
200. Id. at 173-74.
201. See id. at 174.
202. See id. at 176-77; see also J.P. Meagher, Act of State and Sovereign Immunity: The
Marcos Cases, 29 HARV. INT'L L.J. 127, 127-34 (1988) (discussing the Marcos Litigation in
the United States).
203. See Deutsche Nemectron GmbH v. Dolker [1984] B.C.L.R. 162.
204. See United States of America v. Ivey [1995] O.R.3d 533.
1999]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
III. Swiss ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS BASED ON
FOREIGN PUBLIC LAW
A. Introduction and Applicable Law
The federal legislature exercised its power to regulate the en-
forcement of foreign judgments by enacting the Federal Statute on
Private International Law ("PIL Statute"). 20 5 This became law in
January 1989. The PIL Statute replaced the cantonal rules, and es-
tablished a uniform system of Federal rules. The PIL Statute con-
tains choice of law rules, and regulates the jurisdiction of Swiss
courts and administrative bodies in international matters. It also
controls the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments,
bankruptcy and composition agreements, and international arbi-
tration.2
06
Section 1(2) of the PIL Statute provides that international
treaties take precedence over application of the PIL Statute.207
The enforcement of foreign judgments in the Lugano Convention
on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters ("Lugano Convention") 20 8 is essential. A
brief discussion of its scope follows.
B. The Scope of the Lugano Convention
In 1988, the Member States of the European Union (EU) and
the Member States of the EFTA concluded a convention in
Lugano, Switzerland, on jurisdiction and the international en-
forcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters. The
Lugano Convention is based on the Brussels Convention, 20 9 and
205. See infra Appendix 1.
206. See PIL Statute §1; D. HOCHSTRASSER & N.P. VOGT, COMMERCIAL
LITIGATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN SWITZERLAND 80 (1995).
207. Switzerland has ratified various multilateral conventions, including, for example:
The Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Matters of
Maintenance of Minors, Apr. 15, 1968; The Hague Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Maintenance Orders, Oct. 2, 1973.
208. See SR 0.275.11. Statute in force for Switzerland since January 1, 1992. For
translation see BUTTERWORTHS JURISDICrION, FOREIGN JUDGMENTS AND AWARDS
HANDBOOK 666 (Graham S. McBain ed., 1994) [hereinafter BUTrERWORTHS
JURISDICTION].
209. See Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, Sept. 1968, in force among the original Member States since Febru-
ary 1, 1973. The Brussels Convention is reprinted in BUTTERWORTHS JURISDICTION, su-
pra note 208, at 661.
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thereby shares many identical provisions. 210 The purpose of the
Lugano Convention is to extend the principles of the Brussels
Convention to non-EU countries.
211
An important feature of both the Lugano and Brussels Con-
vention ("Conventions") is that except in very limited circum-
stances, the courts of Member States may not question the jurisdic-
tion of the original court in enforcement proceedings. 212 Instead,
the Conventions contain rules of international jurisdiction that
bind the enforcing court to the original court's findings of fact.
The jurisdiction of the original court may only be reviewed under
the provisions contained in the Conventions themselves.
213
The scope of both Conventions is defined by article 1, which
is common to both Conventions:
Article 1. This Convention shall apply in civil and commercial
matters whatever the nature of the court or tribunal. It shall
not extend, in particular, to revenue, customs or administrative
matters.
The convention shall not apply to:
1. the status or legal capacity of natural persons, rights in prop-
erty arising out of a matrimonial relationship, wills and succes-
sion;
2. bankruptcy, proceedings relating to the winding-up of insol-
vent companies or other legal persons, judicial arrangements,
compositions and analogous proceedings;
3. social security arbitration.
Article 1 of the Conventions raises the following questions
that are pertinent to this discussion. First, why is the scope limited
210. Jenard and M6ller's report on the Lugano Convention is reprinted in
BUTrERWORTHS JURISDICTION, supra note 208, at 731. See also R.C. Reuland, The Rec-
ognition of Judgments in the European Community: The Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of the
Brussels Convention, 14 MICH. J. OF INT'L L. 559, 570 (1993).
211. As of July 1995, the Lugano Convention is applicable among the following coun-
tries: Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Austria, Belgium, Den-
mark, Greece and Iceland have signed but not yet ratified the Convention.
212. See European Communities - European Free Trade Association: Convention on
Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Sept. 16,
1988, art. 28(a), 28 I.L.M. 620,629 [hereinafter Lugano Convention].
213. See id. art. 28(3). For further grounds, though very limited, for challenging the
original court's jurisdiction see id. art. 27(2).
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to "civil and commercial matters"? Second, according to which le-
gal system is the characterization to be done? 214 Third, what ex-
actly constitutes a "civil" or a "commercial matter"? Finally, why
are certain fields of law enumerated in paragraph 2 of article 1 ex-
cluded?
The limitation to "civil and commercial matters" is explained
in article 220 of the EEC Treaty.215 "Member States shall, so far
as necessary, enter into negotiations with each other with a view to
securing for the benefit of their nationals. . . the simplification of
formalities governing the reciprocal recognition and enforcement
of judgments of courts or tribunals and arbitration awards." 2
16
State claims and related matters, therefore, were not the goal
of the mutual enforcement treaty. Presumably, the authors of the
Brussels Convention assumed that the limitation on the Conven-
tion's scope to "civil and commercial matters" would cover the as-
signment as formulated in Article 220 of the EEC Treaty.217 Fur-
thermore, judgments other than civil and commercial, such as
criminal judgments, either fall outside the scope of the economic
union, or relate to the public administration of economic matters,
which are properly addressed by Community laws.
The characterization of a "civil and commercial matter," is
aided by L. T. U. v. Eurocontrol.218 In this case, Eurocontrol, a
public organization that provided air navigation safety services,
brought an action in Brussels against a German company, alleging
that the German company owed money to Eurocontrol. The Bel-
214. See supra note 85 and accompanying text; F.A. MANN, supra note 17, at 662.
215. Id.
216. See T.C. HARTLEY, CIVIL JURISDIC7ION AND JUDGMENTS 1 (1984) (emphasis
added).
217. It should be noted that neither the original text of the 1968 Brussels Convention
nor the accompanying report by Jenard included a definition of "civil and commercial
matters" (as opposed to "public law"). After their accession to the. Brussels Convention, it
was apparent that Ireland and the United Kingdom make almost no distinction between
private and public law. See P. Schlosser, Report on the Accession of Denmark, Ireland
and the United Kingdom to the Brussels Convention, in BUTTERWORTHS JURISDICTION,
supra note 208, at 706.
218. Case 29/76, L.T.U. v. Eurocontrol, 1976 E.C.R. 1541. This case was decided under
the Brussels Convention, which is not applicable in Switzerland. The scope of the Lugano
Convention, however, is Worded identically, so the Eurocontrol decision may nevertheless
be of considerable importance for the construction of article 1 of the Lugano Convention.
Furthermore, the Member States of the EU and the EFTA agreed on an Annex to the
Lugano Convention in order to "prevent, in full deference to the independence of the
courts, divergent interpretations" of the Brussels and the Lugano Conventions. See
Lugano Convention, supra note 212, at 641.
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gium court ruled for Eurocontrol and rejected the defendant's ar-
gument that the matter was one of public law.219 Eurocontrol sub-
sequently sought enforcement in Germany. The German court,
however, requested a preliminary ruling from the European Court
of Justice with respect to the meaning of "civil and commercial
matters." It wanted to know whether the Brussels Convention was
applicable at all.
The European Court ruled that the expression "civil and
commercial matters" must be independent and interpreted by ref-
erence, "first to the objectives and scheme of the Convention and,
secondly, to the general principles which stem from the corpus of
the national legal systems."220 Indeed, characterizing "civil and
commercial matters" according to an independent community
definition was the only possible way to secure an equal and uni-
form interpretation within all of the Member States. 221 Applying
this new standard, the court stated that although certain proceed-
ings between a public authority and a private person or company
may fall within the scope of the Convention, cases in which the
public authority exercises its powers are excluded.222 The court
found that there is a strong indication of governmental exercise of
power when the use of services, such as those provided by Euro-
control, are obligatory and the scale of charges and procedures for
their collection were fixed unilaterally by the public authority.
Consequently, the judgment was not enforceable under the Brus-
sels Convention. 223
Netherlands v. Ruffer is a second case that dealt with the in-
terpretation of a "civil and commercial matter. ' 224 In this case, a
219. See Eurocontrol, 1976 E.C.R. at 1542.
220. Id. at 1551-52.
221. For a deeper analysis of this "independent Community interpretation," see
PETER KAYE, CIVIL JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS 62-84
(1987).
222. In rendering its decision, the court used the German phrase "hoheitliche Befug-
nisse." This can be translated as "sovereign power." In French the common term is "puis-
sance publique."
223. See id. at 590. In Case 9, 10/77, Bavaria Fluggesellschaft Schwabe and Germanair
v. Eurocontrol, 1977 E.C.R. 1517, a case based on the same facts, Eurocontrol prevailed in
the enforcement proceedings under a bilateral treaty between Belgium and Germany.
The scope of this treaty was also limited to civil and commercial matters. Under the prac-
tice existing in Germany prior to the Eurocontrol case, however, it was recognized that the
judgment had to be classified according to the law of the judgment-granting country. See
HARTLEY, supra note 216, at 13.
224. See Netherlands v. Riiffer [1980] E.C.R. 3807; see also HARTLEY, supra note 216,
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German-owned vessel sunk in the Bight of Watum. According to
a treaty between Germany and the Netherlands, the Netherlands
was responsible for "river-police functions" regarding the Bight. If
the Dutch government viewed the German vessel as a danger to
other ships, it raised and disposed of the ship. It then brought an
action for the recovery of costs in the Dutch courts. The issue was
whether the Dutch courts had jurisdiction under the Brussels Con-
vention. If the matter could be considered "civil" or "commer-
cial," as opposed to a public-law proceeding, jurisdiction would be
proper. According to Dutch law, the right to recover costs is based
on the ordinary law of tort.225 The court, however, considered the
removal of the wreck to be an exercise of the Dutch Government's
"governmental" or "sovereign" powers. It concluded, therefore,
that the claim for costs must have also been made in the exercise
of "governmental" or "sovereign" powers. Based thereon, the
Riffer court held that the Dutch courts were without jurisdiction.
The Riffer court failed to distinguish the act of removal of the
wreck (which might properly be considered a governmental act)
from the compensatory claim aiming to recover the costs.
226
There are various reasons for the exclusions catalogued in ar-
ticle 1, paragraph 2 of the Lugano Convention. The Lugano Con-
vention exempted arbitration because there were already several
international treaties in force, and the Committee of Experts
("Committee") did not see the need to add to the existing body of
law.227 Bankruptcy and related matters were excluded because the
Committee deemed that a separate convention would be more ap-
propriate for such complex matters. 2
28
Similarly, the Committee excluded matters concerning the
status or legal capacity of natural persons, rights in property aris-
ing out of a matrimonial relationship, and wills and succession.
Thus, the Committee recognized the wide disparity of these mat-
ters in the various legal systems of the Member States. This dis-
parity includes both substantive law and jurisdictional rule, as well
at 13-16; KAYE, supra note 221, at 70-82.
225. See HARTLEY, supra note 216, at 14.
226. For a critique, see A.D. BESSENICH, DER AUSLANDISCHE STAAT ALS KLAGER
200-02 (Basel & Frankfurt, 1993); Ivey, O.R.3d 533.
227. See KAYE, supra note 221, at 146-150; HARTLEY, supra note 216, at 23; Reuland,
supra note 210, at 588.
228. See KAYE, supra note 221, at 129-44; HARTLEY, supra note 216, at 20-21; Reu-
land, supra note 210, at 586-87.
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as conflict rules. The Committee feared that the courts would ap-
ply the public policy exception too frequently 229 and be tempted to
reexamine the foreign court's judgment granting jurisdiction.
Therefore, rather than risk disruption of the Lugano Convention's
effectiveness, the Committee of Experts excluded such matters al-
together.2
30
There are two reasons for the exclusion of social security mat-
ters. First, some countries treat social security issues as matters of
public law,231 which creates difficulties in light of article 1, para-
graph 1 of the Convention and the Eurocontrol decision. Second,
as with arbitration, substantial regulation of this area of law is al-
ready in place. 232 Commentators agree, however, that the Con-
vention does apply to a limited class of subrogation claims brought
by the social security authority against a tortfeasor.233
In conclusion, there are two basic reasons for an issue's exclu-
sion under the Convention. First, there may be a separate conven-
tion dealing with the specific branch of law. Alternatively, the ex-
clusion may be based on the fear that defenses of violation of
public policy 234 or lack of international jurisdiction 235 would be in-
voked too often, jeopardizing the effectiveness of the Convention.
C. Enforceable Judgments under the PIL Statute
1. Introduction
In general, foreign judgments may be enforced if they qualify
as a "decision in a civil matter, ' 236 also referred to as a "private
law matter."237 Therefore, it is generally held that judgments
based on foreign private law are enforceable, and judgments based
on foreign public law are not.238
229. As provided in Lugano Convention, supra note 212, art. 27(1).
230. See Reuland, supra note 210, at 583-587; HARTLEY, supra note 216, at 16; KAYE,
supra note 221, at 85-129.
231. Or partly as a matter of tax law.
232. See KAYE, supra note 221, at 144-45.
233. See id. at 145-46; HARTLEY, supra note 216, at 21-22. See also discussion on
Brussels Convention supra Part I.C.3 and infra Part III.D.6.
234. See discussion on Brussels Convention supra Part III.A.
235. See infra Part I.E.2.
236. See infra Part III.D.
237. German:"Entscheid in Zivilsachen"; French: "Dicision en matidre civile."
238. See generally, M. Guldener, Das internationale und interkantonale Zivilprozess-
recht der Schweiz 97 (1951); T.S. STOJAN, Die Anerkennung auslidndischer Zivilurteile in
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In 1980, the Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland held:
"En vertu du principe de la territorialitd, le droit public n'est
applicable que dans l'Etat qui l'a ddictd: en r~gle g6ndrale, le droit
public 6tranger ne trouve donc ni application ni execution en
Suisse." 239 Thus, Swiss law provides the standard for characteriz-
ing something as a civil matter.
240
While Swiss law provides theories which aim to distinguish
private law from public law,241 the application of these theories
poses great difficulties even within the domestic context for which
they were developed. These theories might encounter even
greater difficulties when they are applied to foreign law.
The general rule of non-application and non-enforcement of
foreign public law is broad, yet formal in its application. The
courts must decide whether the foreign judgment is based on pub-
lic or private law. In the former, the courts must refuse enforce-
ment. The courts have failed to answer the important question of
whether the sovereignty of Switzerland is at stake.
In Ammon v. Royal Dutch, the Federal Supreme Court of
Switzerland narrowed the scope of the public law rule.242 The case
turned upon measures adopted by the Dutch Government enacted
to counteract the confiscation of property belonging to Dutch citi-
zens by the German occupation forces. Based on this (public law)
legislation, the Royal Dutch Company refused to register Ammon
as a shareholder of the company with respect to shares Ammon
had bought at the Zurich Stock Exchange. This refusal was based
on the Dutch authorities' identification of these shares as part of
Handelssachen 60-63 (1986); H.U. Walder, EinfiAhrung in das internationale Zivilprozess-
recht in der Schweiz 30 (1989); R. Hauser, Zur Vollstreckbar-erklarung auslixndischer
Leistungsurteile in der Schweiz, in F.S. KELLER 589 (1989).
239. Judgment of the II Civil Chamber of the Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland,
June 26, 1980 (unpublished).
240. See BGE 79 II 87; see also STOJAN, supra note 238, at 61; IPRG KOMMENTAR,
supra note 2, at 256 (a reexamination of the nature of the claim must be implemented de-
spite the prohibition of the rdvision au fond).
241. See R. FLEINER, GRUNDZOGE DES ALLGEMEINEN UND SCHWEIZERISCHEN
VERWALTUNGSRECHTS 37 (1977); F. GYGI, VERWALTUNGSRECHT 36 (1986). According
to the "theory of interests," laws which serve the public interest belong to the public law,
whereas laws which serve private interests belong to the private law. The "theory of sub-
jects" looks to the parties involved. If at least one of the parties is a public authority, the
legal relation is likely to be of a public nature. Finally, the "theory of subordination" dis-
tinguishes private law from public law by determining whether the parties are legally equal
and act as partners or whether one party is subordinate to the other.
242. SeeBGE80II53.
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the confiscated goods formerly belonging to Dutch inhabitants. 243
Ammon brought an action for damages against Royal Dutch be-
fore the Swiss courts. On appeal, the Federal Supreme Court of
Switzerland characterized the issue as a question of company law,
and therefore held that Dutch law was applicable.244 Ammon ar-
gued that the Dutch legislation designed to counteract confiscation
falls within the category of non-applicable foreign public law. The
Supreme Court agreed with Ammon's argument insofar as the
Dutch legislation was foreign public law. The court, however, dis-
tinguished between foreign public law serving primarily "egoistic"
interests of the state and foreign public law which strengthens or
protects the interests of individuals. 245 With respect to the latter
category of public law, the so-called "private-law-friendly" public
law, the court saw no reason to deny the application for the sole
reason that the law in question was of a public law nature.246
Ammon v. Royal Dutch introduced an important limitation to
the public law rule. Although the distinction between "private-
law-friendly" public law and public law "enacted in the interest of
the state itself" seems artificial and arbitrary, it has opened the
way towards a more favorable application of foreign public law in
Switzerland.
BGE 75 II 125 (1949)247 is another case where the Federal
Supreme Court of Switzerland chose a more imaginative approach
than the one provided for by the public law rule. In this case, the
State of Hungary brought an action against a former employee
who withheld the key to a safe deposit box at a Swiss bank. The
safe contained Hungarian assets designated as governmental
funds. The defendant refused to recognize the constitutionality of
the new Communist Government and defended the action by ar-
guing that the civil courts had no jurisdiction because the claim in
question stemmed from a relationship governed by foreign public
law. The Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland admitted the
claim, holding that the duties of the defendant may well have their
basis in Hungarian public law. The Court noted that the defen-
243. See id. at 53-55; Vischer, supra note 5, at 183.
244. See BGE 80 II at 58-61.
245. See id. at 62; Vischer, supra note 5, at 183. For a harsh critique of this distinction,
see F.A. Mann, Conflict of Laws and Public Law, in RECUEIL DES COURS 190-91 (A.W.
Sijthoff, ed., 1971) [hereinafter F.A. Mann, Public Law].
246. See BGE 80 II at 63.
247. BGE 75 II 125.
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dant became subject to the general principles of private law once
the public service relationship was terminated. The defendant had
to surrender the key because the termination of his public office
suspended the right to retain the instrumentum possessionis, which
had been entrusted to him.
248
Instead of merely characterizing the claim as one of either
public or private law, the court managed to apply "general princi-
ples of private law." Based on this consideration, the court
granted the plaintiff's application. In so doing, the court avoided
embarrassing the foreign state by denying a claim for the sole rea-
son that the lex causae was a foreign public law.
2. The Operation of Foreign Public Law in the PIL Statute
The general rule of non-application and non-enforcement of
foreign public law has been expressed in several decisions of the
Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland.249 Whether this rule is still
valid, however, is open for debate under the regime of the PIL
Statute. Sentence two, article 13 of the PIL Statute deals with the
application of foreign public law. The section reads, "[a] foreign
provision is not inapplicable for the sole reason that it is charac-
terized as public law." 250 Although the PIL Statute provides for a
conclusive set of rules with regard to recognition and enforcement
of foreign judgments,251 it does not contain any provisions that ac-
tually define the scope of enforceable judgments.
There has not been, however, a Supreme Court judgment
confirming the public law rule in accordance with the cases ren-
dered before the PIL Statute came into force.252 The IPRG-
Kommentar, which is probably the most influential commentary
on the PIL Statute, refers to the cases decided before the new stat-
248. See Vischer, supra note 5, at 189.
249. See BGE 42 II 183; BGE 50 II 58; BGE 74 II 279. Lastly, see (although toned
down) the opinion of the Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland in BGE 107 11489,492.
250. Compare the 1975 resolution of the Institute de droit international: 1. 1. The
public-law character attributed to a provision of foreign law which is designated by the
rule of conflict of laws shall not prevent the application of that provision, subject to the
fundamental reservation of public policy. Baade, supra note 27, at 50.
251. See App. 1, §§ 25-32.
252. In BGE 118 11353, the Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland made the following
statement: "Neither according to the PIL Statute nor according to the previous case law
and doctrine, which was even more restrictive with respect to public intervention law [of-
fentlichrechtliches Eingriffsrecht], may foreign public law which serves to enforce sover-
eign claims [Machtanspriiche] be recognized." [author's translation].
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ute came into effect.25
3
Article 13 of the PIL Statute, however, raises many questions.
First, section 13 deals with the (direct) application of foreign law,
so it is not entirely clear whether this provision should also operate
with respect to the enforcement of judgments. At the least, it
seems safe to say that the exclusion of foreign public law in en-
forcement proceedings is less stringent than with regard to the di-
rect application of foreign laws that are at odds with Swiss legal
concepts.
254
The more difficult question is whether foreign public law may
be applied if it is the lex causae of a case, or whether article 13 is
simply meant to incorporate existing case law by allowing for the
preliminary or incidental application of foreign law ("private-law-
friendly" public law) into the new PIL Statute.255 Article 13 of the
PIL Statute seems to allow for a less rigid exclusion of foreign
public law. The Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland agreed
with this view in BGE 118 II 353 (1992), where it stated that the
law before the introduction of the PIL Statute was more restrictive
with respect to foreign public intervention law.
256
D. Specific Branches of Public Law
1. Non-Enforcement of Foreign Criminal Judgments
Based on the foregoing chapter, it is clear that foreign crimi-
nal judgments will be considered unenforceable under the PIL
Statute. 257 Swiss authorities, however, will grant judicial assistance
in criminal matters according to both international treaties and the
Federal Statute on International Legal Assistance in Criminal
Matters. 258
253. See IPRG KOMMENTAR, supra note 2, at 256.
254. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
255. This question was left open in IPRG KOMMENTAR, supra note 2, at 107-108.
256. See BGE 118 11353.
257. See STOJAN, supra note 238, at 66--67; BESSENICH, supra note 226, at 190-91; but
see IPRG KOMMENTAR, supra note 2, at 256.
258. SR 351.1 art. 74(2) (Switz.) (provides for the seizure and transfer of proceeds of
crime (producta sceleris) to the requesting state for the purposes of forfeiture and/or resti-
tution). See BESSENICH, supra note 226, at 216. Furthermore, according to SR 351.1 art.
94 (Switz.), foreign criminal judgments may be enforced under certain conditions. See id.
at 198-99.
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2. Enforcement of Judgments Awarding Punitive Damages
Difficulties arise with respect to the enforcement of punitive
or multiple 259 damages awarded to private litigants in civil pro-
ceedings.260 There are two cases where Swiss courts had to ad-
dress the enforceability of U.S. judgments awarding punitive dam-
ages.
In one unpublished case, plaintiffs attempted to enforce a
Texas state court judgment in the Canton of St. Gallen, Switzer-
land.261 The Texas judgment, based on the defendant's misrepre-
sentation in connection with the sale of real estate, awarded puni-
tive damages three times the amount of the actual damages. In its
1982 decision, the Swiss District Court denied enforcement be-
cause the Texas judgment violated the policy of Bereicherungsver-
bot Bereicherungsuerbot.262 This Swiss public policy requires that
a damages award not put the plaintiff in a better financial position
than he would have been in had the damage or loss not occurred.
The District Court further held that the purpose of the punitive
damages (deterrence and punishment) lacked a "civil" character,
an additional reason not to enforce the Texas judgment. 263 Ap-
parently, the decision was not appealed.
In the second case, the Civil Court of the Town-Canton of
Basle enforced a U.S. judgment awarding punitive damages. 264 In
S.F., Inc. v. TC.S. AG, the Swiss company T.C.S. AG conducted
transportation services for S.F., Inc., a California company. The
parties had stipulated that English law would be applied. After a
dispute arose between the two parties, T.C.S. AG brought an ac-
tion before a California District Court claiming outstanding fees
259. For the sake of brevity, this Article will only refer to "punitive" damages. Where
other considerations are relevant with regard to multiple damages reference thereto will
be made.
260. Cf. supra note 91.
261. Unpublished decision rendered by the District Court of Sargans before the PIL
Statute was in force. See J. Drolshammer & H. Scharer, Die Verletzung des materiellen
ordre public als Verweigerungsgrund bei der Vollstreckung eines US-amerikanischen 'puni-
tive damages-Urteils,' 82 SJZ 309 (1986); M. Bernet & N.C. Ulmer, Recognition and En-
forcement in Switzerland of US Judgments Containing an Award of Punitive Damages, 22
IBL at 272 (1994).
262. With regard to the Bereicherungsverbot, see infra notes 274-75 and accompanying
text.
263. See Bernet & Ulmer, supra note 261, at 273.
264. The judgment in S.F,. Inc. v. T.C.S. AG was confirmed by the Court of Appeal of
BJM 1991 n.31, 38. The appeal to the Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland was rejected
on procedural grounds. See BGE 116 11376.
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for the services. S.F., Inc. filed a counterclaim for damages re-
garding the misappropriation of containers they had provided and
for punitive damages based on fraud. The court held S.F., Inc. li-
able in the amount of $70,800.19. S.F., Inc., however, was to re-
cover actual damages of $120,060 and punitive damages in the
amount of $50,000. S.F., Inc. successfully enforced the outstanding
balance of $99,259.81 at T.C.S. AG's domicile in Basle.
265
From the Swiss point of view, there are three basic questions
regarding the enforcement of punitive damages:
266
(i) Should a judgment awarding punitive damages be consid-
ered a civil judgment at all?
(ii) Would Swiss public policy be offended by enforcing such a
judgment?
(iii) In case the punitive award cannot be enforced, should
there be a partial enforcement of the judgment?
In answering the first question, we can note that ten years
ago, Swiss scholars tended to regard punitive damages as penal in
nature, and therefore concluded that such judgments were not en-
forceable in Switzerland. 267 Indeed, under Swiss law, punitive
damages may not be awarded, as they fulfill to a large extent the
functions reserved for criminal law, namely punishment and deter-
rence.26
8
More recent authors point out that under the Federal Statute
on International Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters,269 judg-
ments that include punitive damages do not fall within the cate-
gory of criminal judgments. Therefore, some argue that such
judgments fall within the scope of the PIL Statute.270
265. I will refer to the court's reasoning below.
266. See CH. LENZ, AMERIKANISCHE PUNITIVE DAMAGES VOR DEM SCHWEIZER
RICHTER 133 (1992).
267. See P.C. HONEGGER, AMERIKANISCHE OFFENLEGUNGSPFLICHTEN IN
KONFLIKT MIT SCHWEIZERISCHEN GEHEIMHALTUNGSPFLICHTEN 213, 219-20 (1986);
G. Kaufmann-Kohler, Enforcement of United States Judgments in Switzerland 35
WIRTSCHAFT UND RECHT 211, 243 (1983) (concerning treble damages); STOJAN, supra
note 238, n.66 (question left open) and n.74 (enforceability rejected with respect to treble
damages in U.S. anti-trust litigation).
268. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
269. See LENZ, supra note 266, at 137. In BGE 116 II 378, the Federal Supreme Court
of Switzerland held that a foreign judgment awarding punitive damages is not a criminal
judgment as defined by the Federal Statute on International Legal Assistance in Criminal
Matters. The court, however, did not say that judgments including punitive damages fall
within the scope of the PIL Statute.
270. See IPRG KOMMENTAR, supra note 2, at 1200.
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Furthermore, Swiss civil law also employs penal sanctions.
Contractual penalties (peine conventionnelle or clause p~nale), for
instance, are commonly enforced.271 These penalties are founded
on a contractual basis where the contracting parties consent to pay
damages in case of a breach of contract. This latter argument,
however, is not valid with respect to the statutorily provided
"compensation" 272 owed by an employer to an employee in the
case of improper notice of termination.273 There is a similar provi-
sion regarding the unjustified dismissal of an employee. 274 These
provisions punish the wrongdoer and prevent others from repeat-
ing such malicious behavior.275 Swiss civil law recognizes, albeit
under very limited conditions, claims featuring penal elements and
claims which may over-compensate an aggrieved party. Therefore,
judgments awarding punitive damages should be considered a pri-
vate law matter under the PIL Statute.
276
With this in mind, the Appeal Court of Basle in S.F., Inc. v.
T.C.S. AG held that a judgment awarding punitive damages must
be characterized as a "civil matter" in the sense of the PIL Stat-
ute. 277 The court was aware of the penal element in the California
judgment, but distinguished between "criminal law punishments"
(kriminalrechtliche Strafe) and "private law punishments" (priva-
trechtliche Strafe).278 The court went on to hold:
While the former (i.e., criminal law punishments) are founded
on the state's right to punish, the latter serve to secure and en-
force private law claims. The fact that they (private law pun-
ishments) serve [inter alia] a penal function, does not alter any-
271. See SR 220 art. 160 (Switz.).
272. The word "compensation" is not accurate in this context because the employee is
entitled to a certain sum of money irrespective of financial loss.
273. "The compensation shall be determined by the judge considering all circum-
stances. It shall, however, not exceed the employee's wages for six months. Claims for
damages on other legal grounds are unaffected." SR 220 art. 336a(2).
274. See SR 220 art. 337(c) (Switz.).
275. See LENZ, supra note 266, at 99-105.
276. In cases with multiple damages, however, where private parties act as "private
attorney generals," then the penal code would apply under RICO. See 15 U.S.C. § 15(a)
(1998).
277. See BJM 1991 n.33.
278. Swiss law does not recognize punitive damages: "Le droit civil connait aussi des
sanctions et offre, par l'institution de la peine conventionnelle ou clause p6nale, un moyen
de coercition qui agit sur le contrevent comme le ferait une sanction de droit public. Cette
fonction pratique ne la fait pas sortir juridiquement du domaine du droit privd." BGE 57 I
204.
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thing with respect to their qualification as an institution of the
private law. Therefore, a judgment that pronounces such a pri-
vate law punishment is a private law matter in the sense of
Swiss enforcement law.279 (footnotes omitted, author's transla-
tion)
The second issue relates to the public policy exception. In the
field of products liability, a plaintiff might be entitled to punitive
or multiple damages according to the applicable foreign lex cau-
sae.280 Article 135(2) of the PIL Statute, however, limits the
amount of damages recoverable by these types of plaintiffs before
Swiss courts. Assuming that this provision is also applicable in en-
forcement proceedings, article 135(2) does not allow enforcement
of the penal portion of an award, but allows enforcement for ac-
tual damages.
281
In other fields of the law where punitive damages may be
awarded, the courts will face the difficult task of applying the gen-
eral public policy exception. A fundamental principle of the Swiss
law of damages is the rule that an aggrieved party may not be
overcompensated by damages (Bereicherungsverbot).282 The Swiss
law of damages basically allows claims for two types of damages:
compensatory, and pain and suffering. Compensatory damages
are limited to the actual economic damage caused by the tortious
act or the breach of contract. Tort law damages for pain and suf-
fering are available only to compensate a party for non-economic
loss, such as pain or other psychological or physical stress. The
prohibition on overcompensation of an aggrieved party is inter-
woven into Swiss public policy.283 Punitive damages may be
awarded, however, in order to reimburse a party's attorneys'
fees.284 Here, there is no overcompensation because Swiss courts
ex officio award attorneys' fees to the prevailing party (to some ex-
tent). Swiss public policy, therefore, does not exclude punitive
279. BJM 1991 n.32-33.
280. See SR 291 art. 135(2) (Switz.).
281. The amount of actual damages must be determined by applicable foreign law such
as the lex causae. This is true even where the lex causae considers the actual damages to a
greater extent than would domestic law. The limitation set forth in SR 291 article 135(2)
tries to exclude categories of damages not known to Swiss law. See IPRG KOMMENTAR,
supra note 2, at 1179.
282. See supra note 272 and accompanying text.
283. See THEO GUHL, ET AL., DAS SCHWEIZERISCHE OBLIGATIONENRECHT (7th ed.
1980); KARL OFTINGER, SCHWEIZERISCHES HAFTPFLICHTRECHT 66 (4th ed. 1975).
284. See supra note 94 concerning purposes of punitive damages.
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damages as compensation for attorneys' fees.
In addition to strictly compensatory claims, the Swiss Code on
Obligations allows claims for unjust enrichment.285 These punitive
damages, which restore profits unjustly realized by the defendant,
could also be enforceable under Swiss law.
286
As discussed above, Swiss civil law may have certain penal
repercussions. From the Swiss point of view, punitive damages are
dangerous because of the potential for broad application and ex-
cessive awards. The public policy test should therefore focus on
the amount a party is overcompensated, and the reasons why puni-
tive damages were awarded. This requires a thorough examina-
tion of the merits of the case, which article 27(3) of the PIL Statute
permits. Whenever the incompatibility with public policy is at is-
sue, an examination should be in order.
Furthermore, the doctrine of restrained application of the
public policy exception in enforcement proceedings (ordre public
att~nu6)287 and the doctrine of "Binnenbeziehung,''288 direct a
court to be more tolerant of foreign judgments, where they offend
fundamental principles of Swiss law.
Turning to the third question regarding the partial enforce-
ment of punitive damages, courts should always be allowed to re-
view the merits of a case. The courts can review the decisive fac-
tors leading to the punitive damages award, and feel free to award
the whole amount, a partial amount, or none of the punitive dam-
ages.28
9
Courts should consider the following factors: (1) proximity of
the case to the Swiss forum;290 (2) nature of the punitive damages
(compensatory, restitutionary or truly penal); and (3) amount of
punitive damages designated to actually punish.291
285. See SR 220 art. 62 (Switz.).
286. In BJM 1991 note 36, the court emphasized that punitive damages were designed
to prevent unjust enrichment rather than to serve as a means of deterrence.
287. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
288. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
289. See Bernet & Ulmer, supra note 261, at 274.
290. For example, if the parties are domiciled in Switzerland: (i) for tort cases examine
if the wrong or the effect thereof occurred in Switzerland and (ii) for contractual claims
examine if the contract is to be performed in Switzerland, or (iii) if there are other close
contacts to Switzerland, and if the parties agreed to Swiss jurisdiction. Swiss courts should
be more tolerant in applying the public policy exception where there are many connecting
factors. Where only the assets are located in Switzerland, for example, there would be in-
sufficient connecting factors.
291. Figures are hard to attain. Nevertheless, truly punitive damages (designed to
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In conclusion, there is still no definite authority regarding the
enforcement of punitive damages. It can safely be said, however,
that punitive damages judgments are neither per se outside the
scope of the PIL Statute, nor are they per se incompatible with
Swiss public policy.
292
3. Non-Enforcement of Foreign Tax Judgments
According to the Swiss view, tax laws constitute a typical
public law matter, and are enforced ex officio by each state based
on its constitutional power over its people. Therefore, Swiss
courts will not directly or indirectly enforce foreign tax judg-
ments.293 Generally, there are no differences between Canadian
and Swiss law in this area.
294
4. Recognition of Bankruptcy Decrees
According to article 166 of the PIL Statute, if the country
where the bankruptcy decree was made grants reciprocity, a for-
eign bankruptcy decree issued in the country of the debtor's domi-
cile will be recognized upon motion by the foreign trustee/receiver
in bankruptcy, or by one of the creditors. Such a motion must be
brought before a Swiss court in the jurisdiction where the assets
are located. 2
95
Once a foreign bankruptcy decree is recognized, the debtor's
assets in Switzerland are subject to both Swiss bankruptcy law and
Swiss rules concerning priority of payments. 296 These rules pro-
punish and deter) that exceed 50% of the actual damages awarded seem outrageous, even
if there are only minimal contacts with Switzerland.
292. In 1992, the German Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof) held that foreign judg-
ments encompassing damage awards that exceed compensation for the damages suffered
are not enforceable because they violate German public policy. See BGHZ 118, 312. It
further held that those damages which are compensatory, however, can be enforced even
though they may exceed what a German court would award. See A.R. Fiebig, The Recog-
nition and Enforcement of Punitive Damage Awards in Germany: Recent Developments,
22 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 635, 648 (1992); Patrick J. Nettesheim & Henning Stahl, Bun-
desgerichshof Rejects Enforcement of United States Punitive Damages Award, 28 TEX.
INT'L LU. 415 (1993).
293. See STOJAN, supra note 238, at 65; M. KELLER & K. SIEHR, ALLGEMEINE
LEHREN DES IPR 162 (1986).
294. But see discussion infra Part IV on the handling of foreign tax claims in interna-
tional bankruptcy cases.
295. SR 291 art. 167(1) (Switz.). A bankrupt debtor's claims are deemed to be located
at the domicile of his or her debts. See SR 291 art. 167(3) (Switz.).
296. See id. art. 170(1) (Switz.).
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vide that secured creditors are paid equally, irrespective of their
domicile.297 On the other hand, unsecured priority claims of credi-
tors domiciled in Switzerland receive the first distributions.298 Af-
ter satisfaction of the claims of the secured creditors (of any domi-
cile), and the preferred creditors domiciled in Switzerland, the
remaining balance is made available to the foreign trustee/receiver
or to the empowered creditors in bankruptcy.299 This balance,
however, will be made available only after the foreign schedule of
claims has been recognized by the Swiss court.300 The fact that a
foreign schedule of claims includes tax claims or social security
claims is no reason for refusing to recognize the schedule.30 1
5. Judgments for Costs
Under Swiss law, there are two different kinds of costs to be
considered. The first category is actual court costs. These are paid
to the court or state treasury by the losing party. In the absence of
an international agreement, claims for such costs are unenforce-
able.30
2
Court awarded attorney fees, however, are enforceable so
long as the primary judgment is enforceable within Switzerland.30 3
A court order granting a winning party indemnification for court
costs would probably be treated in a similar way. It would be en-
forceable if the underlying judgment is also enforceable.
3°4
6. Social Security Matters
If payments to the social security program are mandatory,
judgments will be unenforceable under the PIL Statute.30 5 Swiss
courts, however, will enforce a foreign judgment compelling pay-
ments from a voluntary program.306
297. Foreign tax claims are not permitted. See BESSENICH, supra note 226, at 215.
29& See id. art. 172 (Switz.).
299. See id. art. 173(1) (Switz.). Therefore, preferred creditors domiciled in Switzer-
land have to claim their rights directly in foreign bankruptcy proceedings.
300. See SR 291 art. 173(2) (Switz.).
301. See BESSENICH, supra note 226, at 216 (for further references).
302. See iUt at 205.
303. See id. at 216; see also STOJAN, supra note 238, at 50.
304. But see Deutsche Nemectron GmbH v. Dolker [1984] B.C.L.R. 162
and accompanying text.
305. See STOJAN, supra note 238, n.65.
306. See it
[Vol. 21:55
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
Where a foreign provision provides for subrogation of the
rights of recovery, Swiss courts will apply the foreign rule, regard-
less of whether the rule could be considered public in nature.
30 7
Similarly, courts will enforce a judgment granted to an insurer re-
gardless of how the subrogation law is classified.
7. Enforcement of Securities Laws
This section examines the enforceability of judgments by U.S.
courts and/or the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) ordering the disgorgement of profits based on the violation
of U.S. securities law.30 8 In order to accomplish this task, an out-
line of the legal nature of disgorgement proceedings will be ex-
amined before turning to disgorgement judgments under Swiss
law.
Disgorgement is a form of civil restitutionary remedy for un-
just enrichment. The 1971 case of SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co.30 9 introduced the equitable remedy of disgorgement in the
United States. One prerequisite for a judgment ordering disgor-
gement is a violation of the securities legislation. 310 The U.S. Sec-
ond Circuit Court of Appeals stated that disgorgement "is a
method of forcing a defendant to give up the amount by which he
was unjustly enriched,"' 311 and that, when ordering disgorgement,
"the court is not awarding damages.., but is exercising... discre-
tion to prevent unjust enrichment.
'312
Disgorgement is available where the defendant has profited
from illegal conduct. Although one would expect that the injured
party would receive the profits, such "restitution" is not a crucial
element of a claim for disgorgement. 313 While disgorgement al-
ways involves the reversal of unjust enrichment, it does not neces-
sarily involve the remedy of restitution, and may be distinguished
307. See IPRG KOMMENTAR, supra note 2, at 1238. It makes reference to SR 291 art.
13(2) (Swtiz.). The Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland applied foreign public law sub-
rogation provisions before the enactment of the PIL Statute, as long as they were not fun-
damentally different from Swiss subrogation norms. See BGE 107 11489, 492-93.
308. Compare supra Part I.C.
309. See 446 F.2d 1301, 1307-08 (2d Cir. 1971).
310. See SEC v. Unifund SAL, 910 F.2d 1028, 1041 (2d Cir. 1990).
311. SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 102 (1978).
312- Id. at 95.
313. See R.C. Flynn, SEC Distribution Plans in Insider Trading Cases, 48 Bus. LAW.
107, 121 (1992).
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on this basis.314
A disgorgement order does not depend on proof that any par-
ties have been injured by the illegal conduct.315 As previously dis-
cussed, the courts will use the recovered funds to compensate in-
jured parties316 in accordance with a distribution plan.317 When
the proceeds of the disgorgement cannot be distributed to injured
parties, they are paid out to the U.S. Treasury. 318 Also, if the pro-
ceeds of disgorgement exceed the sum of legitimate private claims,
the excess may be transferred to the Treasury.319 In accordance
with these policies, a U.S. District Court dismissed a claim for the
return of excess funds filed by the person whose profits had been
ordered disgorged. The court held:
[In a suit] commenced by the SEC as a law enforcement
agency.., to permit the return of the unclaimed funds, a portion
of the illicit profits, would impair the full impact of the deterrent
force that is essential if the adequate enforcement of the securities
acts is to be achieved.320
It is necessary for the exploration of Swiss law to assume that
the illegal profits fall within Swiss jurisdiction and that the SEC
has tried to enforce a disgorgement judgment at the Swiss forum
arresti. First, the U.S. characterization of SEC disgorgement
claims as civil is not decisive, since this only says the claim is not
criminal in nature.321 Disgorgement claims aim to deprive the de-
fendant of the illegal profit made in violation of securities laws. In
addition, they allow "ill-gotten gains" to be obtained and trans-
ferred to the U.S. courts' jurisdiction, where they will be distrib-
uted according to the U.S. courts' distribution plan. The disgor-
gement judgment does not, however, determine the obligations
between private parties.322 Rather, it is intended to secure and re-
314. For discussion on the traditional remedy of disgorgement and its distinction from
compensation and restitution, see L.D. Smith, Ontex Resources Ltd. v. Metalore Resources
Ltd., 73 CAN. B. REV. 259 (1994).
315. It is assumed that if a participant in a securities exchange profits violates the law,
that others incur losses or, at the very least, not profit as much as they would have had the
violation not occurred.
316. This is not the primary objective of disgorgement. See Flynn, supra note 313.
317. See id Approved by the court ordering the disgorgement.
31& See id.
319. SEC v. Lund, 570 F. Supp. 1397 (C.D. Cal. 1983); SEC v. Blavin, 760 F.2d 706, 711
(1985).
320. See SEC v. Golconda Mining, 327 F. Supp. 257,259 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
321. See Frei, supra note 28.
322. A disgorgement judgment would deal with obligations between private parties if
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patriate the funds. Any attempt to enforce a SEC disgorgement
judgment in Switzerland must, therefore, be characterized as an at-
tempt to enforce foreign executionary measures within the Swiss
territory. Foreign executionary measures ordered by foreign
courts fall within the category of non-enforceable foreign laws, and
a judgment based upon such laws cannot be enforced in Switzer-
land.
The same conclusion can be reached by an analysis of the
U.S. securities legislation and the responsibilities of the SEC
within this scheme. U.S. securities laws are designed to protect the
integrity of securities markets and thus, may be characterized as
laws designed for public ends.323 The SEC is a powerful state
agency324 vested with a unique power of disgorgement not avail-
able to a private person.325 These features clearly lead to the con-
clusion that SEC disgorgement judgments, according to the Swiss
point of view, have to be considered an administrative matter.
326
There is no need to characterize U.S. legislation as penal.327
Under Swiss law, disgorgement judgments are administrative in
nature, which is reason enough, according to Swiss law, to refuse
enforcement.
8. Judgments Based on Environmental Laws
There are no available cases where the enforcement of a for-
eign judgment based on environmental law is at issue. 328 It seems
highly doubtful, however, that Swiss courts would enforce a for-
eign judgment awarding clean-up costs to a foreign administrative
authority. 329 Although the substance of the claim could clearly be
considered compensatory in nature, the administrative character
of such a judgment would weigh against Swiss enforcement. A
they were with compensatory claims for injured parties or to a traditional party claim for
restitution.
323. See BGE 80 II 53 (Switz.) for a discussion of the "theory of interests."
324. See id. (discussing the "theory of subjects").
325. See id. (discussing the "theory of subordination").
326. "[T]he disgorgement proceedings [initiated by the SEC] amounted to the en-
forcement of a sanction, power or right at the instance of the State in its sovereign capac-
ity, and were, therefore, part of its public law." Nanus Asia Co. v. Standard Chartered
Bank [1990] 1 H.K.L.R. 396. See also Lawrence Collins, Provisional and Protective Meas-
ures in International Litigation, in RECUEIL DES COURS 133 (1992).
327. See Schemmer v. Property Resources Ltd. 1973 S. No. 6773 273,288(1975).
328. See Rtzffer E.C.R. at 3807.
329. See Ivey, 26 O.R.3d at 534.
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party seeking enforcement of such a judgment would be well-
advised to refer to the Hungarian case 330 and argue that "general
principles of private international law" oblige a tortfeasor to pay
compensation for the damages he has caused.
9. Judgments Based on Competition and Anti-Trust Laws
Article 137(2) of the PIL Statute expressly deals with the ap-
plication of restraint of competition law. Article 137(2) states that
even where foreign law is applicable, no damages may be awarded
beyond those that would be awarded under Swiss law.
331
The majority of Swiss scholars characterize treble damages
under U.S. anti-trust legislation as penal or administrative matters
in nature, and therefore fall within the public law exclusion. 332 A
partial enforcement of the actual damages, as available under
Swiss law, should be allowed.
10. Conclusion
In the Swiss law of conflicts, there is a general rule that judg-
ments based on foreign public law are not enforceable. Also, the
Lugano Convention, the single most important multilateral treaty
with respect to the enforcement of foreign judgments, limits its
scope of application to "civil and commercial matters."
The Swiss Federal Supreme Court, however, has introduced
exceptions to the rule of non-enforcement. These exceptions con-
siderably limit the scope of the public law rule. Ammon v. Royal
Dutch opened the door for the enforcement of foreign public law
that was enacted to protect and strengthen the interests of private
parties.333 In one case, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court enforced
a claim based on foreign public law by applying general principles
of private law.3 34 Additionally, the PIL Statute contains rules for
the recognition of foreign bankruptcy decrees. Under the condi-
tions in the PIL Statute, these rules allow the transfer of assets to
another jurisdiction irrespective of whether those assets will be
used for satisfying tax or social security claims.
330. See BGE 75 11125; see also supra Part I.C.1.
331. See SR 291 art. 135(2) (Switz.).
332. See Kaufmann-Koller, supra note 267, at 242-44; STOJAN, supra note 238, at 74.
Cf. LENZ, supra note 266, at 136. (Note that LENZ fails to distinguish between punitive
and treble damages).
333. See BGE 80 II 58,61.
334. See BGE 75 11125; see also supra Part I.C.1.
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Uncertainties exist with regard to punitive and treble dam-
ages, mainly because this legal institution is unknown in Swiss law.
Judgments awarding punitive damages should be dealt with under
the PIL Statute, but must be subject to a thorough examination
under the public policy doctrine.
E. Comparative Analysis
Canadian exclusionary law started with a "tax and penal
rule." This basic rule has been expanded by English judgments
and scholars. Thus, Canada now includes "other public law" as a
third category of non-enforceable judgments. This public law rule,
however, was never approved by the either the House of Lords or
any Supreme Court of common law jurisdiction. Switzerland, on
the other hand, began with the premise that all foreign public law
is unenforceable in Switzerland. Therefore, Swiss law began to
develop certain exceptions to the public law rule.
Despite those different starting points, a comparison of Ca-
nadian and Swiss law shows a remarkable level of conformity to
the results of cases tried before Swiss and Canadian courts. Al-
though the legal roots of the "non-enforcement of specific judg-
ments" rule of the two jurisdictions are quite different, the inde-
pendent evolution of both jurisdictions' law has led to striking
similarities in the results of individual cases. In fact, there is reci-
procity to a very great extent.
There are two ways to examine what it means to say reci-
procity between Canadian and Swiss law in the investigated mat-
ter. First, the two legal systems may have arrived at a "natural
frontier" by voluntarily enforcing each other's judgments. In that
case, further development may be impossible. Second, it could
mean that it is time to mutually evolve the law in a direction which
will allow courts to enforce judgments that have traditionally been
excluded from enforcement. In Part IV of this Article, there will
be further discussion of the rationale for the "non-enforcement
rule," a critique of the reasons given for its existence, and other
plausible answers to the definition of reciprocity.
1999]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
IV. RATIONALE FOR REFUSING THE ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN
PUBLIC LAW JUDGMENTS
A. Introduction
Several justifications support the rule that foreign penal tax
and certain other public laws335 must not be enforced internation-
ally.336 Some reasons might be valid in the direct application of
foreign public law, but are of no significance in the context of
judgment enforcement. 337 Others, such as those expressed in U.S.
v. Harden, reject all effects of foreign public law. In Harden, the
court held that the general rule of non-application of foreign tax
laws also applies in the context of judgment enforcement:
[A] foreign State cannot escape the application of this rule
[non-enforcement of foreign tax claims], which is one of public
policy, by taking a judgment in its own courts and bringing suit
here on that judgment. The claim asserted remains a claim for
taxes. It has not, in our courts, merged in the judgment; en-
forcement of the judgment would be enforcement of the tax
claim.
3 38
Further justification of non-enforcement of foreign public law
judgments are covered by other prerequisites of enforcement as
outlined in Part I.F. Problems of "long-arm jurisdiction," unfair
proceedings, and morally offending foreign legislation are covered
by the requirements of jurisdiction in the international sense,
339
natural justice, and public policy. This Part explores "judgment
enforcement jurisdiction" or "admissibility of judgment enforce-
335. For the sake of brevity, the term "public law" will refer to the specific field of for-
eign laws that are held unenforceable under Canadian or Swiss law. See supra Parts II, III.
336. See references in F.A. MANN, supra note 17, at 360.
337. See, e.g., KELLER & SIEHR, supra note 293, at 160 (regarding the domestic
authorities lack of legitimacy in dealing with foreign public law). See id. at 161; see also
F.A. Mann, Public Law, supra note 245, at 170; see also Baade, supra note 27, at 41 (dis-
cussing the difficulties concerning the correct application of the foreign procedural and
substantive law). Assume that state A sues a person before the court of state B based on
an original tax claim. If the court of state B denies state A's claim, state A will be bound
by state B's decision (resjudicata). In practice, however, it seems unlikely state A will ac-
cept state B's decision. If the foreign law violates the public policy of the forum, should
(and could) the court apply its own public law? To do so seems problematic.
338. United States v. Harden [1963] S.C.R. at 371.
339. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 298 (4th ed.
1990). See also HUGH M. KINDRED ED., INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS
INTERPRETED AND APPLIED IN CANADA 423 (5th ed. 1993).
[Vol. 21:55
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
ment.' '340 Thus, the only reason for not enforcing the judgment or
tax assessment would be the penal or the tax rule provisions, re-
spectively.
After excluding reasons which do not provide an appropriate
explanation in the context of judgment enforcement,341 two expla-
nations remain which merit a more thorough examination. First,
since the public policy test always applies in proceedings for the
enforcement of foreign judgments, it could cause political embar-
rassment if the enforcing court holds that a foreign public law is of-
fensive to domestic notions of fundamental justice.342 Secondly, it
has been reasoned that public law is territorially limited to the
boundaries of the enacting state and that international enforce-
ment of such laws violates the sovereignty of the enforcing state.
343
B. The "Courtesy" Argument (Avoid Public Policy Test)
The court in United States of America v. Harden quoted a pas-
sage from Lord Keith of Avonholm's speech in Government of In-
dia v. Taylor. That Article reads:
Another explanation has been given by an eminent American
judge, Judge Learned Hand, in the case of Moore v. Mitchell.
This explanation is also quoted by Kingsmill Moore J. in the
case of Peter Buchanen Ltd as follows: 'While the origin of the
exception in the case of penal liabilities does not appear in the
books, a sound basis for it exists, in my judgment, which in-
cludes liabilities for taxes as well. Even in the case of ordinary
municipal liabilities, a court will not recognize those arising in a
foreign State, if they run counter to the "settled public policy"
of its own. Thus a scrutiny of the liability is necessarily always
in reserve, and the possibility that it will be found not to accord
with the policy of the domestic State. This is not a troublesome
or delicate inquiry when the question arises between private
persons, but it takes on quite another face when it concerns the
relations between the foreign State and its own citizens or even
those who may be temporarily within its borders. To pass upon
the provisions for the public order of another State is, or at any
340. Canadian courts often refuse jurisdiction in cases where the public law rule ap-
plies. See, e.g., United States v. Harden [1963] S.C.R. at 372-73 (quoting Buchanen [1955]
A.C. at 516). Swiss courts hold foreign public law claims or judgments as "inadmissible."
See BESSENICH, supra note 226, at 41.
341. See Ivey, O.R.3d at 534.
342. See supra Part II.B.
343. See supra Part II.C.
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rate should be, beyond the powers of the court; it involves the
relations between the States themselves, with which courts are
incompetent to deal, and which are entrusted to other authori-
ties. It may commit the domestic State to a position which
would seriously embarrass its neighbor. Revenue laws fall
within the same reasoning; they affect a State in matters as vital
to its existence as its criminal laws. No court ought to under-
take an inquiry which it cannot prosecute without determining
whether those laws are consonant with its own notions of what
is proper.' 34
4
Judge Learned Hand, in the passage quoted by Lord Keith of
Avonholm, relies on an exaggerated effect of the act of state doc-
trine.345 This view suggests that a domestic court should generally
deny enforcement of foreign public law judgments.
This "courtesy argument," however, ignores the fact that the
foreign state voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the domestic
court. By doing so, the state waives its immunity. In addition, the
explanation with respect to the embarrassment of the foreign state
is unconvincing. Judge Hand's reasoning assumes that the flat re-
fusal to even consider the foreign tax law or judgments based
thereupon causes less embarrassment to another state than does
an examination of the foreign tax law under the public policy doc-
trine. This assumption can hardly be upheld. It is certainly true
that some types of foreign taxes must be disregarded when they
are discriminatory or entirely arbitrary,346 but the possibility of
rejection in some cases should not be urged in favor of total disre-
gard of all revenue laws.347
The rationale outlined above is an unconvincing explanation
and does not justify the exclusion of foreign public law judgments.
344. F.A. MANN, supra note 17, at 370-71.
345. See id. at 361. Regarding the act of state doctrine, see BROWNLIE, supra note 339,
at 507-08. Regarding state immunities, see KINDRED, supra note 339, at 280.
346. "Retroactive legislation, such as was brought about by the Finance Act, 1943 [the
foreign tax law], has recently come in for a great deal of criticism from sober thinkers on
the ground that it is ethically and politically immoral." Buchanan [1955] A.C. at 517.
Kingsmill Moore J., however, dismissed the action based on the exclusionary rule and not
on the ground that the foreign law violated domestic public policy. See id.
347. See Castel, Tax Claims, supra note 33, at 297.
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C. Enforcement of Public Law Judgments as a Violation of
Territorial Sovereignty
1. Cases and Doctrine
In Government of India v. Taylor,348 Lord Keith of Avonholm
gave another, more convincing, explanation for the exclusionary
rule. Again, the relevant sentences of that speech were adopted by
and quoted in United States of America v. Harden:
One explanation of the rule thus illustrated may be thought to
be that enforcement of a claim for taxes is but an extension of
the sovereign power which imposed the taxes, and that an asser-
tion of sovereign authority by one State within the territory of
another, as distinct from a patrimonial claim by a foreign sover-
eign, is (treaty or convention apart) contrary to all concepts of
independent sovereignties.
349
In Huntington v. Attrill,350 Lord Watson spoke four times of
an "international rule" 351 requiring the unenforceability of foreign
penal laws and of those actions (which include "penal actions")
which "by the law of nations are exclusively assigned to their do-
mestic forum." 3
52
The rationale of the exclusionary rule in relation to revenue,
penal, and other public laws is that these laws may not be enforced
because they stem from the jus imperii of a state. Thus, the en-
forcement of a state's jurisdiction is limited to the state's bounda-
ries.353 The enforcement of such jure imperii claims or sovereign
powers within the territory of another state would infringe the en-
forcing state's sovereignty, and therefore violate public interna-
tional law.354
348. See Government of India v. Taylor [1955] E.R. 292. In Re Sefel Geophysical Ltd.,
however, the court found no Canadian authority that would bind the court to the holding
in Taylor.
349. United States v. Harden [1963] S.C.R. at 370.
350. Huntington v. Attrill [1893] A.C. 150 (P.C.).
351. See id. at 151,155,157, 161.
352 See id. at 156.
353. See KINDRED, supra note 339, at 284,289, 290 (rightly pointing out that a precise
distinction between acta jure imperii and acta jure gestionis may be impossible); see also
F.A. MANN, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 499(1973)[hereinafter MANN
INTERNATIONAL LAW] which also admits the difficulties in determining acta jure imperii.
354. See MANN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 353 at 495; see also F.A. Mann,
Public Law, supra note 245, at 168:
The State which tries to recover penalties or taxes within the territory of another
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Similarly, the Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland consid-
ers all public law as territorially limited to the state which enacted
the public law in question. Therefore, the court held that foreign
public laws per se cannot have any impact outside that very
state.355 Swiss courts will not enforce judgments based on a body
of law which, according to Swiss standards, is public in nature. The
underlying assumption is that all public law is implemented via
state power and is intended to maintain and guarantee a state's
sovereignty within its territory. The enforcement of such laws is
done jure imperii and acta jure imperii must per definitionem be
limited to the territory of a state.356
The question is whether a rule of public international law
which prohibits the enforcement of foreign public law judgments
actually exists. A related question is whether state enforcement of
* another state's public law judgments would endanger the enforcing
state's independence and sovereignty. The next section briefly
outlines the principle of territorial sovereignty.
2. The Principle of Territorial Sovereignty
The most important rule derived from the principle of territo-
rial sovereignty is that one state may not exercise its power, in any
form, within the territory of another state. 357 A "state" is defined
by the presence of three essential elements: the exercise of undele-
gated governmental power, over a definite population, and in a de-
State purports to exercise extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction. This is so,
whether it sends troops or a bailiff, whether it issues letters of demand or insti-
tutes proceedings in the courts of the forum, thus using the latter's system of ju-
dicial administration and machinery. Even the last-mentioned method involves
the assertion that the claimant State is entitled to recover its penalties and taxes
in the territory of the State of the forum. It is the assertion of the right to have its
sovereign powers in regard to penalties and taxes respected and enforced that
constitutes the infringement of the sovereignty of the State of the forum and
therefore is contrary to international law.
See also NORTH & FAWCETT, supra note 119, at 114; DICEY AND MORRIS, supra note 2,
at 101.
355. See Judgment of the II Civil Chamber of the Federal Supreme Court of Switzer-
land (June 26, 1980) (unpublished); see also quoted material supra note 239.
356. See Vischer, supra note 5, at 151.
357. See The Steamship Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.) 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18 (Sept.
7): "[Tjhe first and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a State is
that-failing the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary-it may not exercise its
power in any form in the territory of another State"; see also Baade, supra note 27 at 10;
KINDRED, supra note 339, at 426ff.
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fined territory.358 Therefore, a state which permits other states to
exercise sovereign authority on its territory, beyond specific in-
stances expressly agreed upon, faces the danger of losing one of
the essential prerequisites of statehood. 359 This may be the true
rationale underlying the exclusionary rule.
There is no obligation of any state to enforce a foreign judg-
ment, excepting treaties or conventions. A foreign judgment is an
acta jure imperii, and has no legal force outside the jurisdiction of
the rendering court, except where the enforcing state's law sup-
plies rules to that effect. But the "no effect per se" rule of foreign
judgments equally applies to all foreign judgments, private law as
well as public law.
Does public international law, therefore, oblige states to pro-
tect tax dodgers and other individuals corporations, rather than
risk losing its sovereignty and status as a legal person in interna-
tional law? Would Canada or Switzerland really jeopardize their
independence and sovereignty if they enforced tax judgments?
3. Critique
R. Frank is the most profound critic of this rule of public in-
ternational law.360 Frank states that:
A foreign State which attempts to appear as plaintiff in a do-
mestic court does not interfere with foreign sovereign rights,
but humbly and simply requests that the domestic jurisdiction
should be put at his disposal for the decision of a specific case.
In the event of such request being complied with there can be
no question of the infringement of foreign sovereignty; in the
event of it being rejected, the realm of domestic sovereignty
likewise remains intact.3
61
Frank argues that the decisive issue is under what circum-
stances and conditions a jurisdiction will place its courts at the dis-
position of a foreign claimant state.362 Frank convincingly con-
cludes that if a state refuses to enforce foreign public law, the
358. See Baade, supra note 27, at 10; see also BROWNLIE, supra note 339, at 72ff.;
KINDRED, supra note 339, at 12ff.
359. See Baade, supra note 27, at 10. It is interesting to note that Baade is probably
the only author who addresses the issue clearly and succinctly.
360. See R. FRANK, Offentlich-rechtliche Ansprilche fremder Staaten vor inlindischen
Gerichten (1970) 32 RabelsZ 56ff.
361. See id. at 64 (translation by F. Mann, Public Law, supra note 245, at 169).
362. See id.
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reasons for this refusal must be found within the state's domestic
law, and not because there is a public international law rule pro-
hibiting the enforcement.
363
The principle of territorial sovereignty says only that a state
may not exercise sovereign rights within the territory of another
state against the latter's will. Notwithstanding F.A. Mann's opin-
ion,364 the mere filing of a foreign public law claim or the applica-
tion to enforce such a judgment cannot be viewed as an unlawful
extension of sovereign power. Even if the domestic court decides
to grant, or enforce, judgment for the foreign state, it is solely the
forum state which acts jure imperii. Whether a state wants to en-
force foreign public law is entirely up to the forum state, and has
to be decided in accordance with its own interests.365 The internal
law of each state must decide whether, and to what extent, the
courts have the power to enforce foreign public law judgments.
366
4. Conclusion
In the absence of treaty obligations, there is no duty to en-
force foreign judgments of any kind. There is, however, no rule of
public international law which actually prohibits such enforce-
ment.367 Each state must decide the extent to which its courts will
enforce foreign public law judgments.
As Castel points out, with respect to foreign tax laws, the im-
plementation of the non-enforcement rule has greatly exceeded
Lord Mansfield's intended effect when he uttered that "no country
ever takes notice of the revenue laws of another."
368
Despite the lack of any intrinsic justification for the a priori
exclusion on the enforcement of foreign public law judgments,
there seems to be an international consensus that foreign enforce-
ment of criminal and tax matters will only occur by way of treaties
363. See id; see also P. Lalive, "L'application du droit public dtranger," Annuaire de
l'Institut de Droit International, Session de Wiesbaden (1975) 219, at 250; P. Lalive, "Sur
l'application du droit public 6tranger" (1971) 27 S.J.I.R. 103, at 134.
364. See MANN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 353 at 499.
365. See BESSENICH, supra note 226, at 63.
366. See infra Part IV.D.
367. The direct application of foreign public law in domestic courts poses many addi-
tional problems which renders the direct application of foreign law impracticable.
36& See Holman v. Johnson, [1775] 98 Eng. Rep. 1120; see also Castel, "Tax Claims,"
supra note 33, at 292. Castel rightly states "[a] rule is never so well established as to pre-
clude inquiry into its justification or to preclude its abandonment if justice is promoted by
doing so." Id.
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and/or legislation.369 Without such a basis, courts feel that they
have no power to enforce such judgments.
370
Due to the lack of a convincing explanation for the public law
rule, this dogma should be restricted to criminal and revenue mat-
ters. Further, within these two categories, the rule should be in-
terpreted narrowly. With respect to "other public laws," courts
should not refuse the enforcement of judgments for the sole rea-
son that the lex causae of a case is rooted in foreign public law.
Rather, courts should be obliged to apply the public policy test and
state in each case why the enforcement of a specific judgment
would be detrimental to domestic morality and fairness, or to the
state's vital interests. While articulating the public policy that
leads to non-enforcement may sometimes embarrass another state,
it recognizes the lack of an adequate justification for a mechanical
exclusionary rule. It also opens the door for a more justice-
oriented law.
D. Outlook
Public international law does not prohibit the enforcement of
foreign public law judgments. The entire matter of the "exclusion-
ary rule" falls within the competence of domestic law. Its devel-
opment depends on the peculiarities of Canadian and Swiss law.
Therefore, different solutions will be sought in either jurisdiction
for the further development of this area.
1. Canadian Law
Having acknowledged the lack of a compelling reason to ex-
clude public law judgments from international enforcement, the
question arises as to how, or on what basis, judges should and may
approach such issues.
The principle of comity may present an adequate basis for a
more favorable attitude towards judgment enforcement. In Mor-
guard Investments Ltd. v. De Savoye, Judge La Forest said:
For my part, I much prefer the more complete formulation of
the idea of comity adopted by the Supreme Court of the Unites
[recte: United] States in Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895), at
pp. 163-64, in a passage cited by Estey J. in Spencer v. The
Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 278, at 283, as follows:
369. See, e.g., F. A. MANN, supra note 17, at 361ff.
370. But see discussion infra Part IV.D.
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'Comity' in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute ob-
ligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will,
upon the other. But it is the recognition which one nation al-
lows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial
acts of another nation, having due regard both to international
duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or
of other persons who are under the protection of its laws...
371
Cases like Re Sefel Geophysics Ltd. and U.S. v. Ivey expressly
relied on comity principles to accept foreign tax claims in domestic
liquidation proceedings,3 72 and to enforce foreign judgments
awarded to a foreign state agency serving foreign public inter-
ests.
37 3
Therefore, under Canadian law, the principle of comity pro-
vides a practical foundation to cope with the enforcement of for-
eign public law judgments on a case by case basis. In this sense,
the rather elusive shape of comity374 reveals itself as an advantage
because of its flexibility in enforcing judgments involving govern-
mental or state sovereignty issues.
375
2. Swiss Law
Although the word "comity" (or any translation thereof) does
not appear once in the over 1170 pages of the IPRG Kommen-
tar,376 it cannot be said that the principle of comity is unknown in
Swiss law. Instead, comity is understood to operate as a guideline
for policy makers and the legislature, rather than as a discretionary
371. Morguard Investments Ltd. v. De Savoye, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077, 1096. With re-
spect to the principle of comity, see MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL LAw 331 (2nd ed. 1993). For a more thorough, but rather critical inves-
tigation regarding comity, see Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 1 (1991) (stating "[m]y thesis is that in this constellation of ideas about comity... ob-
scures the underlying political tensions and makes it more difficult to address important
policy differences among sovereigns."). Id. at 5.
372. See Re Sefel Geophysics Ltd. [1989] 92 A.R. 51, 55ff.
373. See Ivey, O.R.3d at 549-50.
374. See Paul, supra note 371, at 77: "Comity mitigates the conflict between sovereigns
and between private and public law by blurring the lines that divide domestic and interna-
tional law and policy."
375. But see Paul, supra note 371, at 8: "I conclude that a better solution to the courts'
generous application of comity is to allow the political branches of government to resolve
conflict through multilateral negotiation that will coordinate and establish harmony
among the principles of private international law."
376. See IPRG KOMMENTAR, supra note 2.
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rule directly applicable by courts. Courts, therefore, feel that a
statutory basis, including treaties and conventions,377 is a manda-
tory prerequisite for expanding the scope of enforceable judg-
ments.
If the public law rule were abandoned, there would not be a
fundamental change in the enforcement of foreign criminal and tax
judgments. These matters are adjudicated based on domestic leg-
islation and international treaties, respectively, which preempt the
use of the PIL Statute as leges speciales. These laws designate the
competent authorities, provide for specific proceedings, and de-
termine the extent that foreign proceedings may be assisted or for-
eign judgments enforced.
The Federal Statute on International Legal Assistance in
Criminal Matters378 is crucial to the enforcement of criminal
judgments.379 In the field of tax law, Switzerland has executed
numerous tax treaties with other countries designed to prevent
double taxation. None of these international agreements, how-
ever, provide for the enforcement of tax claims and tax judg-
ments.380 In addition, policy considerations make it unlikely that
Switzerland will agree on mutual enforcement rules. The con-
tinuing local adherence to the unenforceability rule, combined
with bank secrecy, still attracts foreigners to invest their assets in
Swiss banks.381
Based on a broad interpretation of article 13 of the PIL Stat-
ute,382 courts could develop a more favorable enforcement prac-
tice in fields other than criminal and tax law. Restitutionary or
compensatory judgments could be enforced, irrespective of
whether they are founded on foreign public law, by referring to the
377. According to Swiss constitutional law, treaties and conventions are applicable
immediately upon ratification; there is no further implementation by way of legislation
needed. See SR 291 art. 1(2).
378. See BGE 42 H 183; BGE 50 1158; BGE 7411279; BGE 107 H 489,492.
379. See supra Part III.D.1.
380. Lack of actual enforcement mechanisms, however, seems to be the rule in modern
double taxation treaties. See BAADE, supra note 27, at 41. See also J.M. Mossner, Taxa-
tion, International Encyclopedia of Public International Law, vol. 8 (Amsterdam: Elsevier
1985), at 502 pointing out: "Levying taxes does not constitute a common interest of the
international community as is the case for example with the struggle against crime or the
protection of the environment." The Canadian-U.S. Tax Treaty, supra note 32, seems to
be a rare exception.
381. Note, however, the treatment of foreign tax claims in international bankruptcy
proceedings, supra Part III.D.4.
382. See supra Part III.C.2.
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"general principle of private law." 383
The public policy exception provides a broad basis for the
non-enforcement of judgments that offend Swiss notions of essen-
tial morality and fairness, and judgments that run counter to Swiss
economic interests. Obviously, this exception would compel the
courts to articulate exactly what is offensive regarding the outcome
of the foreign judgment.
V. CONCLUSION
Canadian and Swiss law independently developed an ad-
vanced regime of rules in the field of judgment enforcement. The
different requirements stipulated in Canadian and in Swiss law,
however, are surprisingly congruent. In both legal systems a cer-
tain judicial "reserve" arises when the judgment is founded on for-
eign public law (mostly penal and tax matters). Awards of "puni-
tive civil sanctions" by foreign courts pose new questions about the
scope of the rule that foreign penal judgments may not be en-
forced in Canada and in Switzerland. This Article argues that
judgments awarding punitive damages should not fall under the
penal law rule.
There is a well-established rule that Canadian courts will ref-
use to enforce foreign penal and tax judgments. Canadian courts
so far have declined to extend this rule to other foreign public
laws. Swiss law, on the other hand, started with the rule that no
foreign public law (including criminal and tax laws) may be en-
forced within Switzerland. Subsequently, the Federal Supreme
Court of Switzerland began to introduce exceptions to this rule be-
cause a broad application of this dogma would create injustice.
Despite these different starting points, a comparative analysis of
Canadian and Swiss law, with respect to the enforcement of for-
eign public law, demonstrates a great deal of conformity in the re-
sults of cases tried before each country's courts.
There is no rule of public international law that actually pro-
hibits the enforcement of foreign penal, tax and other public law
judgments. Courts, however, feel that in the absence of an inter-
national agreement and/or domestic legislation to this effect, that
they have no power to enforce such judgments. Courts feel bound
by an old rule, which has hardly been questioned. Indeed, there
383. See BGE 75 11125 (1949); see also supra note 239 and accompanying text.
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seems to be no adequate justification to flatly exclude foreign
judgments from enforcement solely because they deal with tax or
other public law.
Given these weaknesses, and the lack of an adequate justifica-
tion for the "public law rule," this rule must be reconsidered. The
scope of the rule should be limited to foreign criminal judgments,
in which case international agreements and/or domestic legislation
would be the only foundation for international enforcement. For
foreign tax claims, both legal systems demonstrate a certain oblig-
ing attitude, limited so far to liquidation proceedings. Canadian
courts, aware of the weak justification of the "tax rule," should en-
force foreign tax judgments where appropriate. For example, the
principles of comity were applied when a foreign court ordered the
transfer of assets to Canada for liquidation proceedings under Ca-
nadian law.384 Furthermore, comity favors the enforcement of
foreign tax judgments when the connection is minimal between the
case and the enforcing court.385 In such circumstances, the interest
of the foreign state may override the interest of a domestic court in
maintaining the tax rule.
In Swiss law, there is no such overarching basis for disre-
garding the tax rule. Swiss courts must consider treaties, conven-
tions, and internal legislation as leges speciales. Consequently, tax
law cannot be enforced under the PIL Statute. In the absence of
specific legislation or an applicable treaty, courts have no power to
enforce foreign tax laws or judgments. Swiss courts should, how-
ever, abandon the general rule of non-enforceability of foreign
public law judgments, except in cases involving criminal or tax law.
As elaborated by the courts, the public policy exception (or-
dre public) provides a sufficient basis to refuse enforcement of for-
eign judgments that violate internal conceptions of essential justice
and morality, a state's sovereignty, or the purely economic inter-
ests of a state. Together with the concept of jurisdiction in the in-
ternational sense, the public policy exception guarantees an inter-
national judgment enforcement scheme that benefits both citizens
and states.
384. See Re Sefel Geophysics Ltd. [1989] 92 A.R. 51.
385. Regarding the doctrine of "Binnenbeziehung" and public policy, see BGE 116 II
625.
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APPENDIX 1
Excerpts of the Swiss Federal Statute on Private International Law
of 18 December 1987"
First Chapter: General Provisions
First Section: Field of Application
Section 1
1. This Statute regulates in international matters:
(a) the jurisdiction of the Swiss judicial or administrative author-
ties;
(b) the applicable law;
(c) the conditions for recognition and enforcement of foreign de-
cisions;
(d) bankruptcy and composition;
(e) arbitration.




Unless otherwise provided by this Statute, jurisdiction lies with the




If this Statute does not provide for jurisdiction in Switzerland, and
proceedings abroad are impossible or highly impracticable, juris-
diction lies with the Swiss judicial or administrative authorities at
the place which has a sufficient connection with the case.
SR 291. This English translation relies heavily on the version published by P.A.
Karrer, K.W. Arnold & P.M. Patocchi, Switzerland's Private International Law, (2nd ed.
1994).
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Section 4
III. Validation of Attachment
Unless this Statute provides for another jurisdiction in Switzer-
land, a lawsuit in validation of attachment may be brought at the
Swiss place of attachment.
(. ..
Third Section: Applicable Law
Section 13
I. Scope of Conflicts Rule
Where this Statute refers to foreign law, the reference encom-
passes all provisions that are applicable to the case according to
that law. A foreign provision is not inapplicable for the sole reason
that it is characterized as public law.
(. ..
Section 17
V. Swiss Public Policy Exception
The application of provisions of a foreign law is excluded if the
outcome is incompatible with Swiss public policy.
Section 18
VI. Mandatory Application of Swiss Law
Provisions of Swiss law which, in view of their special policy, must
be applied without regard to the law designated by this Statute
remain reserved.
Section 19
VII. Taking Mandatory Provisions of a Foreign Law into Account
1. A provision of a law other than the one designated by this
Statute that is meant to be applied mandatorily may be taken
into account if interests that are according to Swiss views le-
gitimate and clearly overriding so require and the case is
closely connected to that law.
2. Whether such a provision should be taken into account de-
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pends on its policy and its consequences for a judgment that is
fair according to Swiss views.
(. ..





A foreign decision is recognized in Switzerland:
(a) if jurisdiction lay with the judicial or administrative authorities
of the country in which the decision was rendered;
(b) if no ordinary judicial remedy can any longer be brought
I against the decision or if the decision is final, and
(c) if no ground for non-recognition under Section 27 exists.
Section 26
2. Jurisdiction of Foreign Authorities
Jurisdiction lies with a foreign authority,
(a) if a provision of this Statute so provides or, if there is no such
provision, if the defendant had his or her domicile in the coun-
try where the decision was rendered;
(b) if, in disputes of financial interest, the parties by an agreement
valid under this Statute subjected themselves to the jurisdic-
tion of the authority that rendered the decision;
(c) if in a dispute of financial interest the defendant entered an
unconditional appearance, or
(d) if, in the case of a counterclaim, the authority that rendered
the decision had jurisdiction over the principal claim, and the
two claims are materially connected.
Section 27
3. Grounds for Nonrecognition
1. A foreign decision is not recognized in Switzerland if its recog-
nition would be clearly incompatible with Swiss public policy.
2. A foreign decision is also not recognized if a party proves:
(a) that neither according to the law of its domicile nor according
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to the law of its habitual residence was the party properly
served with process, unless the party entered an unconditional
appearance in the proceedings;
(b) that the judgment was rendered in violation of essential prin-
ciples of Swiss procedural law, especially, the party was denied
the right to be heard;
(c) that a lawsuit between the same parties concerning the same
case was first commenced or decided in Switzerland, or was
first decided in a third country, provided that the prerequisites
for the recognition of that decision are met.




A decision recognized pursuant to Sections 25 to 27 is declared en-
forceable on petition by the interested party.
Section 29
III. Procedure
1. A petition for recognition or declaration of enforceability must
be directed to the competent authority of the canton in which
the foreign decision is invoked. The following must be attached
to the petition:
(a) a complete and certified original of the decision;
(b) a certificate that an ordinary judicial remedy can no longer be
brought against the decision or that the decision is final; and
(c) in case of a decision by default, a document establishing that
the losing party was properly and timely served with process,
and had a reasonable opportunity to defend itself.
2. The party opposing the petition must be heard; the party may
present evidence.
3. If a foreign decision is invoked on a preliminary point, the
authority seized may itself decide recognition.
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Section 30
IV. Settlement in Court
Sections 25 to 29 also apply to settlement in court if, in the country




Sections 25 to 29 apply by analogy to the recognition and enforce-
ment of a judgment or document of noncontentious jurisdiction.
Section 32
VI. Entry in Register of Civil Status
1. A foreign decision of document concerning civil status is re-
corded in the Register of Civil Status if it is so ordered by the
cantonal supervisory authority.
2. Registration is permitted if the conditions of Sections 25 to 27
are met.
3. If it is unclear whether the procedural rights of the parties were
sufficiently safeguarded in the foreign rendering country, the
interested parties must be heard before registration.
(. ..
Ninth Chapter: Obligations
Third Section: Unlawful Acts
Section 135
(b) Products Liability
1. Claims based on a defect or defective description of a product
are governed at the option of the damaged or injured party:
(a) by the law of the country where the damaging party has his or
her business establishment or, if he or she has none, his or her
habitual residence, or
(b) by the law of the country where the product was acquired, un-
less the damaging party proves that it came to market in that
country without his or her assent.
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2. If claims based on a defect or defective description of a product
are governed by foreign law, no damages can be awarded in
Switzerland beyond those that would be awarded under Swiss
law for such a damage or injury.
(. ..
Section 137
(d) Restraint of Competition
1. Claims out of restraint of competition are governed by the law
of the country in whose market the restraint directly affects the
damaged or injured party.
2. If claims of restraint of competition are governed by foreign
law, no damages can be awarded in Switzerland beyond those
that would be awarded under Swiss law in case of an unlawful
restraint of competition.

